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ABSTRACT
This thesis is composed of three essays on consumer behavior in pharmaceuticals
and health insurance markets.
The first essay quantifies the effect of changes in local access to medical marijuana
dispensaries on the use of prescription opioids in Medicare Part D. While concerns
about marijuana as a gateway drug are valid in a small portion of this Medicare
sample, in aggregate this effect is dominated by substitution away from opioids. Fur-
thermore, access to marijuana improves uptake and efficacy of opioid replacement
therapy for the treatment of opioid addiction. These findings suggest that the ex-
pansion of medical marijuana access helps alleviate rather than exacerbate the opioid
epidemic at least among Medicare beneficiaries.
The second essay estimates the effect of poor adherence to statin medication
on medical costs using MarketScan claims data on commercially insured Americans
suffering from cholesterol imbalance. Using variation in statin-related side effect rates
to instrument for adherence, I find that a 30-day supply of statins induces a 1 percent
decrease in total medical costs the following year. Enrollees save proportionally from
statin consumption, yet poor adherence is prevalent. Estimates indicate insurers can
profit by reducing out-of-pocket cost of statin medication.
vi
The third essay explores health insurance choice under the privatized Medicare
“5-star Special Enrollment Period” reform of 2012, which allowed beneficiaries to
switch to 5-star rated plans outside of open enrollment. Exploiting heterogeneity
in exposure to the reform, via the lack of 5-star plans in some markets, we assess
the extent to which enrollees switch plans, both within and across years. We find a
positive and significant increase in the within-year change in enrollment caused by
the reform: switches to 5-star contracts amount to a 7 to 16 percent increase in the
contract enrollment base. Contrary to adverse selection concerns, we find that insurer
risk pools improve, suggesting that the policy was effective in stimulating 5-star plan
enrollment without driving up 5-star plan costs.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Marijuana Access and the Demand for
Opioids in Medicare Part D
Prescription opioid use in the US is substantial. In 2013 alone the economic burden
of prescription opioids in the US was estimated to be $78.5 billion with $28.9 billion
attributed to treatment costs for substance abuse.1 In March 2016 the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) declared the US to be in an “opioid epidemic”;
it also released guidelines acknowledging that prescription opioid treatment is highly
effective in short run pain management but that short term use can lead to long
term use and dependence. Fatalities resulting not only from illicit opioid use but
also from prescribed usage. Part of the issue with targeting policies to alleviate the
epidemic is that though pain is real, and can be debilitating, it is also subjective and
therefore difficult to measure. Policymakers, researchers and advocacy groups still
struggle to engineer solutions. While restrictions on access to prescription opioids
reduce their use, evidence suggests they do so at the cost of a number of undesirable
effects including increased heroin fatalities, increased worker’s compensation time and
greater dissatisfaction with the treatment of pain (Kilby, 2016). It may even reduce
labor force participation (Krueger, 2016). This is regarded as a major problem by the
Federal government which allocated $53 million to help educate, monitor prescriptions
1Estimates from Florence et al. (2016). Additionally, the US consumes more than 99% of the
world total of Hydrocodone and over 80% of the world total of Oxycodone according to Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control hearing: America’s Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and
Prescription Drug Abuse 2014.
2and provide access for medication assisted treatment in August 2016. In this paper I
study how access to medical marijuana impacts the use of prescription opioids and I
provide insight on the interaction between increased access to medical marijuana and
the opioid epidemic.
Recent research, including Bachhuber et al. (2014); Powell et al. (2015); Smart
(2015); Bradford and Bradford (2016) and Kim et al. (2016), suggests that marijuana
may be a viable alternative to opioids for the treatment of pain. This is particularly
relevant in the US where over the past two decades marijuana access has been rapidly
increasing. The earliest medical marijuana law was implemented in California in 1996
and, as of 2014, 23 states as well as the District of Columbia had implemented med-
ical marijuana legislation.2 Though state medical marijuana laws differ on specifics,
they have many features in common. In each state it is required that users obtain
a physician’s recommendation and register with the state for a medical marijuana
license. Once licensed, a patient may, depending on the state, either produce their
own marijuana, designate a caregiver to do so on their behalf, or purchase marijuana
from in-state marijuana access points, known as dispensaries.3 Dispensaries function
much like private clubs, in that they only sell to medical marijuana license holders,
but each licensee is effectively unconstrained in the quantity of his or her purchases.
This is substantially different from the provision of other prescription medications,
where quantity is determined by a physician and additional provision requires a new
physician’s visit. Marijuana also differs from other prescription medications in that
it is never covered in whole, or in part, by health insurance. Insured individuals can
acquire most other medications at a heavily subsidized price at the point of purchase.
Despite the intuitive connection between marijuana and opioids no prior research has
linked marijuana and opioid use at the individual level. This is due in part to data
2As of 2014 Colorado and Washington had also legalized recreational marijuana use.
3Sometimes referred to as Collectives or Alternative Treatment Centers.
3constraints.
The peculiar licensing structure, the club-like firms, the lack of insurance coverage
as well as the ambiguous legal territory occupied by the market, inhibit data collec-
tion on marijuana use. Even the estimation of a unit price for marijuana is difficult
since there is substantial price and product differentiation within a dispensary. The
implicit non-observed quality dimension and the lack of quantity data make it im-
possible to determine, even in the aggregate, how much marijuana is being purchased
and consumed. Furthermore, there is no data source that permits linking medical
marijuana license holders to medical claims.
Lacking such data, I made use of the strongest instrument available, the distance
to the nearest medical marijuana dispensary. In the absence of dispensaries, medical
marijuana license holders face a substantial barrier to access; the only alternative is
for patients, or their friend or relatives, to undertake production themselves. Once a
dispensary opens in a state, license holders may still have to travel great distances to
obtain access.4 For the elderly and disabled, especially those suffering chronic pain,
distance is salient and travel costs are a significant barrier to access. As such, the
opening of a medical marijuana dispensary near the patient’s residence serves as a
positive shock to marijuana access.
Nevertheless the effect of marijuana access is a topic of much debate in the US.
On the one hand, proponents of marijuana argue that it is a safer alternative to more
harmful medications. On the other hand, opponents assert that marijuana can be a
“gateway drug,” leading to consumption of other, more harmful, illicit substances and
potential involvement in associated criminal behavior.5 This paper tests these two
4For example, licensees residing in northern Maine would have needed to travel more than 100
miles to have visited the first Maine dispensary.
5Kepple and Freisthler (2012) finds less crime in areas with dispensaries compared to those where
dispensaries are forced to close in California, see Morral et al. (2002) for a discussion of “gateway
effect” associations.
4theories among the sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries (hereafter “beneficiaries”)
living in Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont from 2011 to
2014. These five states implemented dispensary laws and had active dispensaries open
over this time period.6 Linking a panel of Medicare Part D beneficiaries with a panel
of dispensary entries, this paper is the first to estimate the impact of local access to
medical marijuana on the use of opioid pain medication at the individual level.
First, using a difference-in-difference methodology, I found a 2% reduction rela-
tive to the mean in the probability of prescription opioid use from the presence of
a dispensary within 25 miles of a beneficiary’s residence. Among beneficiaries who
used prescription opioids prior to dispensary access, I found a decrease of 0.73 in the
number of days of prescription opioid supplied per quarter as compared to control
beneficiaries in the same state. These results are robust to multiple identification
strategies and to a large extent serve as a lower bound on the degree of substitution.
Specifically, since only patients who obtain medical marijuana licenses can utilize
dispensaries, there is a limit to the number of affected beneficiaries. Similarly, benefi-
ciaries with licenses prior to dispensary access are likely already producing their own
marijuana and thus their utilization of opioids may be unaltered by dispensary access.
Additionally, beneficiaries may be willing to travel further then my distance measures
account for which would biasing estimated effects towards zero. Finally, estimates
from a specification using a different identification strategy, exploiting discontinuity
in marijuana access near borders, due to state laws, are slightly larger in magnitude,
though not statistically distinct.7
Second, by classifying beneficiaries according to their prescription opioid purchases
pre-dispensary access, I decompose the effects by prior intensity of opioid use. By
6Several states with medical marijuana dispensaries were excluded from analysis due to a lack of
panel data on dispensaries or due to access pre-sample. See section 1.2.4 for details.
7Results comparing beneficiaries in the five aforementioned states to all states without dispensary
access are even larger but this specification is not as well identified.
5comparing beneficiaries who obtain dispensary access within 25 miles to those further
away with similar opioid use in the first quarter of 2011, I found that:
1. At all positive levels of initial opioid use, dispensary access decreases the proba-
bility of subsequent opioid use, ranging from 3 percentage points for light users
to 12 percentage points for moderate-heavy users. Overall, dispensary access
tends to reduce prescribed opioid quantity for most users.
2. Concerns about “gateway effects” have some validity. Post-access probability
of opioid use increases by 0.6 percentage points for those using no opioids at
the start of the sample, and some who used little opioids see an increase in
their expected quantity used, but such gateway effects are small compared to
substitution.
Third, using a similar strategy, I explored the relationship between dispensary
access and the use of opioid replacement therapy for the treatment of opioid de-
pendence/addiction.8 I found that, with nearby dispensary access, beneficiaries are
0.1 percentage points more likely to initiate opioid replacement therapy and are 6
percentage points more successful at quitting with opioid replacement therapy than
beneficiaries with similar prescriptions in the first quarter of 2011.
These novel results together suggest that, at least among the elderly and disabled,
access to medical marijuana dispensaries could be a tool to help combat the opioid
epidemic. Compared to policies restricting access to opioids, or expanding access to
medication assisted treatment, expanding access to medical marijuana is substantially
less costly for state and federal governments. For example, implementing prescription
drug monitoring programs requires developing a database accessible to physicians and
pharmacists that protects patients personal health information as well as training
8While medical literature distinguishes addiction and dependance as mental versus physical re-
actions since neither are observable I will use the terms interchangeably.
6physicians and pharmacists to use the system. By contrast, most of the costs of
setting up a medical marijuana market fall on private business owners. Despite lack of
access to credit markets, heavy regulation, and federal illegality all states that allowed
dispensary access have experienced entry, often with more businesses applying to enter
then state limits allow. Also substantial business licensing fees, along with taxes,
generate revenue to support regulation of such markets. The federal government
saves indirectly, as beneficiaries who substitute marijuana for opioids pay the full
price of their marijuana, thereby reducing costs to insurers, who pay for the majority
of the cost of opioids, which in turn reduces the subsidy burden of Medicare Part D
to the federal government.
1.1 Literature
This paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, this paper makes a con-
tribution to our understanding of drug choice in Medicare Part D. Medicare Part
D, established in 2006, has overall led to lower pharmaceutical price growth, (Dug-
gan and Morton, 2008), but consumers have difficulty making efficient plan choices,
putting too much weight on premiums compared to out of pocket costs, (Abaluck and
Gruber, 2011), and tend to suffer from inertia, staying in their default/initial plan
even when better or cheaper alternatives become available (Marzilli Ericson, 2014).
Decarolis (2015) shows that insurers have taken advantage of game-able subsidy rules
leading to accelerated premium growth. The market functions well despite choice
frictions, misperceptions, and insurer strategies. Decarolis et al. (2015) shows that
welfare under the current subsidy mechanism is close to the optimal voucher but still
far from the social planners first best. With regards to opioids, and in particular sub-
stance abuse, Montz et al. (2016) describe how, contrary to the Affordable Care Act,
the Medicare risk adjustment model does not incentivize insurers to select against
7beneficiaries struggling with substance abuse issues. Einav et al. (2016) show that
beneficiaries are not price sensitive with respect to opioids. The lack of price sen-
sitivity and the common choice inconsistencies are barriers to understanding opioid
choice which I overcome by using a shock to the outside option, in this case marijuana
access, to identify changes in opioid use.
Second, the methodology of this paper provides a unique context for understand-
ing addiction. The majority of studies exploring addictive goods use variations of
the Becker and Murphy. (1988) rational addiction model to estimate changes in cur-
rent consumption from future price changes by exploiting the effect of past (stock
of) consumption on the marginal value of current consumption.9 While such models
are informative for tax policy and dynamic pricing, they do not speak to the reason
why an individual might initiate or cease using an addictive substance. Bernheim
and Rangel (2004) extended the rational addiction model to incorporate such fea-
tures but the model is theoretical and too many of the parameters of the model are
unobservable to allow estimation. Smith and Tasndi (2007) combined the rational
addiction model with observations from neuroscience in what they call the “natural
addiction model” by providing conditions under which addictive behavior is derived
from evolutionary survival responses and show that the implications of their model
match well with biomedical literature concerning the action of opiates10 in the brains
of mammals but again this model is illustrative but not estimable. By contrast,
this paper contributes to the addiction literature by showing that an increase in the
availability of a substitute for an addictive good increases the likelihood of quitting
attempts and enhances their probability of success, without assuming a structural
9Adjacent complementarity.
10Opiates are the set of non-synthetic opioids.
8form derived from decisions.11
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on entry spillover effects, identifying
the change in quantity of one good demanded from entry in a market for a substitute.
Gentzkow (2007) provides a model for estimating demand in the presence of new
goods that may be complements or substitutes to incumbent goods, but to estimate
this model requires joint purchase data and variation in either prices or markups.
Previous research has looked for spillover effects of marijuana access on crime rates.
Specifically Gavrilova et al. (2015) found a decrease in violent crimes, such as homi-
cides and robberies, in states that border Mexico after MML are introduced. Similarly
Kepple and Freisthler (2012) found less crime in areas with dispensaries compared
to those where dispensaries are forced to close in California after a policy shut down
nearly half the dispensaries in California. These two papers suggest that access to
marijuana may be a substitute for criminal behavior. However access to marijuana
may also induce uptake of other drugs though, as Morral et al. (2002) points out,
all gateway evidence are derived from associations and no causal evidence of such
relationship exists. I contribute to this literature by both showing aggregate opioid
substitution from dispensary entry, and by showing small causal gateway effects for
a sub population.
Fourth, this paper contributes to the discussion on policies regarding opioids and
marijuana. The policy debate on opioids stems from growth in the death rate from
opioids, 9 out of 100,000 Americans died from opioid overdose in 2014 according to
Rudd et al. (2016). Ray et al. (2016) found that long-acting opioids prescribed for
non-cancer chronic pain leads to a significantly increased risk of all-cause mortality,
not just overdoses. This is particularly troubling as Morden et al. (2014) found that
opioid use is especially high among Medicare disabled and that among this popula-
11As documented below, post insurance subsidization, Medicare Part D beneficiaries out-of-pocket
prices for opioid were relatively stable from 2011 to 2014. Unlike rational addiction models, which
require price changes for identification, my framework can function under price stability.
9tion, growth in overall use is driven by switching from acute use to chronic use rather
than more new users. Katz et al. (2013) recommends educating and incentivizing
providers to lower the cost insurers face from prescription opioid abuse. However
Sacarny et al. (2016) found that informing physicians with the highest opioid pre-
scription rates did not influence their prescription patterns. Similarly Reisman et al.
(2009) found that prescription drug monitoring programs, designed to mitigate abuse
though communication between providers and pharmacists, only had relatively mod-
est success. By contrast Buchmueller and Carey (2016) showed that only states with
PDMPs that force physician participation have reduce opioids abuse, but that in such
states beneficiaries are more likely to obtain opioids out of state. Kilby (2016) found
that the benefits of PDMPs are not without consequences as they lead to greater
use of heroin, more time spent on workers compensation and general dissatisfaction
with pain management. Despite the ineffectiveness of these strategies several studies
suggest an alternative potential solution. In particular, access to medical marijuana,
to which this paper contributes.
For comparison Bachhuber et al. (2014) found that states with medical marijuana
laws are associated with lower rates of opioid overdose deaths. Similarly Kim et al.
(2016) found a lower prevalence of opioids among those dying from car accidents in
states with medical marijuana laws compared to states without and Bradford and
Bradford (2016) look at total prescriptions in Medicare Part D finding a negative
association between the presence of medical marijuana laws and quantities of drugs
prescribed for conditions where marijuana may be a viable substitute including opi-
oids. Though these three papers suggest substitution, they are association studies
and thus cannot establish a causal link. Using an instrumental variable strategy,
leveraging changes in federal law enforcement and strictness of state medical mar-
ijuana laws on medical marijuana licensing, Smart (2015) showed that an increase
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in the supply of marijuana leads to heterogeneous effects by age, including reduced
opioid overdose deaths among older adults and increased drunk driving accidents by
youth. Similarly Powell et al. (2015) using difference-in-difference methodology found
that despite no effect of medical marijuana laws on opioid overdose states that have
active dispensaries experience a relative reduction in opioid overdose deaths. This
paper contributes threefold to this literature. It does so by filling a gap in the lit-
erature between marijuana access and opioid related deaths by exploring the change
in opioid use implicitly driving the changes in death rates found in the previous two
papers. Additionally this paper provides insight into individual substitution patterns
and heterogeneity in the effect of access by intensity of opioid use. Finally this pa-
per provides clean identification by comparing within state changes in access thereby
not contaminating estimates with state specific shocks and changes in demographic
composition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 discusses the institutional
background; section 1.3 describes the data; section 1.4 describes the identification
strategy and results and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Medicare Part D
Medicare Part D is a publicly subsidized, heavily regulated, privately operated insur-
ance market covering prescriptions drugs for the elderly and disabled.12 Founded in
2006 by Congress as an extension to the Medicare program, Medicare Part D covered
approximately 37 million individuals in 2014 and, according Congressional Budget
Office estimates, cost the government $76 billion dollars annually. Medicare Part D
12See Duggan et al. (2008a) for an in-depth description of the program.
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plans have a standardized benefit design.13 They typically share a common cost share
structure and regulation stipulates minimal inclusion of drugs for many drug classes.
Further, Medicare Part D plans utilize formularies that serve both as a constrained
choice set, where insurance coverage is only provided for drugs on formulary, and
as tool to nudge consumers to low cost or high value drugs within drug classes. In
particular, formularies specify a set of drugs partitioned into tiers where cost share
is generally increasing in tier but homogenous within a tier. Beneficiaries receive
income-based subsidies on annual plan premiums and some cost share subsidization
is provided for the low income. All plans provide coverage for opioids as well as cov-
erage for drugs used to combat opioid dependence.14 In a 10% sample of Medicare
Part D beneficiaries from 2011 to 2014, on average 31% of beneficiaries fill at least
one opioid prescription in a year and 17% of beneficiaries fill at least one opioid pre-
scription in a quarter-year. The average out of pocket price is approximately $0.50
per day supply of opioids over the sample period.
1.2.2 Opioids
Opioids are a class of medication, in the family of narcotics, used to relieve pain.
They function by reducing the intensity of pain signals reaching the brain but also
have an effect on the brain areas that control emotion.15 The altered state induced
by opioids is of policy concern because opioids can be illegally used as a recreational
drug for the “high” they provide. For example heroin, an illegal opioid, has been
attributed to 3.4 deaths per 100,000 Americans in 2014. Fatalities are not unique
to heroin. All opioids have respiratory depression as a side effect which can lead to
13Plans can deviate from the standard benefit design provided they provide comparable benefits
and/or can provide additional unsubsidized benefits. Plans with additional benefits are termed
“Enhanced” and beneficiaries who choose these plans face the full cost differential between the
enhanced premium and the base premium.
14Specifically different brands of the opioid replacement therapy: buprenorphine with naloxone.
15Specifically opioids attach to cellular receptors in the brain, spinal cord and other organs of the
body reducing the perception of pain and inducing an altered mental state.
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death. Nine per 100,000 Americans died from opioid overdoses in 2014.16 Other com-
mon side effects include sedation, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, constipation, physical
dependence, and tolerance. It is important to note the distinction between physical
dependence and tolerance. In particular physical dependence arises when the body
becomes accustomed to the presence of opioids and upon discontinuation, or a lapse in
use, withdrawal symptoms occur. While withdrawal itself is not life threatening, the
body’s immune system is weakened, allowing potentially life threatening conditions,
such as infections, to arise. Tolerance occurs over sustained opioid use, where the
body becomes resistant to the pain relieving effects of opioids, as well as the toxicity,
forcing the individual to consume higher doses to maintain comparable pain relief.
Opioids, originally derived from the poppy, come in a variety of strength, dosage
form and active chemical molecules. People struggling with opioid dependence may
be prescribed opioid replacement therapy, receive counseling and/or check in to a
treatment center, commonly referred to as methadone clinics. With concerns about
opioid abuse many states have implemented prescription drug monitoring programs
(PDMP) designed to improve communication between doctors and pharmacies. In
particular, since opioids require a prescription, a physician can serve as a gatekeeper
limiting the quantity of opioids that a patient can purchase. However a patient may
see multiple doctors asking for opioids from each. Similarly patients may visit multi-
ple pharmacies to fill their prescriptions. PDMPs function by requiring physicians to
record opioid prescriptions in a database accessible to other physicians and pharma-
cies. In theory this allows a physician to check to see if a patient has already received
opioids from another physician preventing the patient from “doctor shopping”. This
similarly can prevent a patient from filling a prescription at multiple pharmacies.
Despite the good intentions of PDMP’s they have had relatively modest success, see
Reisman et al. (2009), and have been shown to generate adverse spillovers in the form
16Rudd et al. (2016).
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of more time on workers compensation, substitution towards heroin and poor pain
management, see Kilby (2016).
1.2.3 Marijuana
Marijuana is actually a common name for the dried leaf and flower of the cannabis
genus: composed of cannabis sativa, cannabis indica, and cannabis ruderalis. The
slang, derived from the Spanish word ‘marihuana’, was made popular during the on-
set of the US prohibition and has since become the standard terminology for cannabis
in US legislation. To be consistent with legislation, I will continue to use marijuana
in place of cannabis throughout the remainder of this paper. The family of cannabis
plants are rich with cannabinoids, most notable tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) which
produces psychotropic effects and cannabidiol (CBD) which has been shown to func-
tion as an anti-inflammatory, anticonvulsant, antioxidant, antiemetic, anxiolytic and
antipsychotic agent in mammals.17 Cannabinoid receptors, located throughout the
body, are part of the endocannabinoid system which is involved in a variety of phys-
iological processes including appetite, pain-sensation, mood, and memory.18
Recognizing the potential therapeutic benefits of cannabinoids many states have
adopted medical marijuana laws (MML) specifying a set of medical conditions for
which a patient may obtain a medical marijuana licenses. To obtain a license a
patient must see a physician who can prescribe the patient a medical marijuana
license. Licenses are valid for one or two years. After paying the physician and the
state licensing fee the patient is allowed to posses a quantity of marijuana, determined
by the state law, and is protected from state prosecution until the license expires
and must be renewed.19 Depending on the state law the patient may be required
17In 2014 U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved a request to trial a pharmaceutical version
of CBD in children with rare forms of epilepsy. The drug, made by GW Pharmaceuticals, is called
Epidiolex and is currently in clinical trials.
18Fine and Rosenfeld (2013).
19Note that a medical marijuana license does not prevent a patient from being prosecuted in a
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to produce their own marijuana or to designate another as their caregiver who can
produce on their behalf. Some states set up marijuana access points in the form of
dispensaries. Dispensaries allow license holding patients to purchase marijuana, and
other cannabis products, directly instead of having to cultivate and produce their
own. A typical dispensary looks much like a jewelry store, with products behind
glass display cases, and often have a front room or security guard to verify a patient’s
license before allowing them to see the products sold.
1.2.4 Study States
The structure, implementation and uptake of medical marijuana laws varies by state.
This paper explores the impact of access to medical marijuana dispensaries in Con-
necticut, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont, hereafter referred to as the
“study states”. The states with dispensary access that are excluded from sample are
Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico and Washington.
Other then Arizona all of the aforementioned states had some form of dispensary
access prior to 2011.20 Arizona, which first obtained dispensary access in 2012, is
excluded due to a lack of reliable panel of dispensary entry.
In each of the study states only state residents can apply for a medical marijuana
license and dispensaries are only authorized to sell to in state license holders.21 Also
dispensaries business model, owners and location must be approved by a regulatory
authority, constraining what businesses can enter and their choice of location. An
important feature for my identification strategy is that during the sample period none
of the study states allow delivery services. Individual features of the study states,
specifically relevant medical marijuana laws, initial dispensary entry and prevalence
federal court. Marijuana is still a Schedule 1 drug, with no currently accepted medical use and a
high potential for abuse, according to federal law.
20Oregon having had “Cannabis Cafes” prior to medical marijuana law amendment for dispen-
saries.
21This introduces a discontinuity in access between study states and the states that they border.
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of medical marijuana license holders, comprise the remainder of this section.
The first medical marijuana law in Connecticut was signed in May of 2012. The
law stipulates provisions for medical marijuana dispensaries including a screening
process over ownership, only allowing licensed pharmacists to operate dispensaries,
and a state cap of 5 dispensaries license were to be awarded. However in April 2014
when the state first awarded dispensaries licenses there were more registered patients
than the state anticipated. The state awarded licenses to six of the 27 applicants.
The first dispensary opened its doors to serve the medical marijuana population in
August of 2014, and by September 2015 there the number of registered patients went
from 1,990 to 5,357.
Maine’s first medical marijuana law was signed in 1999 authorizing medical use of
marijuana although it did not include provisions for marijuana access. The law was
replaced in 2009, and amended in 2011, to its current form. In terms of dispensaries,
the state designated 8 service areas allowing applicants to submit a business plan.
The business plans were scored on a 100 point scale and the best applicant with a
score above 70 was allocated the service area. Two of the 8 service areas did not
receive applications scoring above 70 points inducing a second round of applications.
Dispensary owners were constrained in their choice of location working closely with
regulators and under strict zoning requirements. Due in part to strict regulation and
to logistical complications dispensaries did not all open at the same time with entry
occurring throughout the sample period.22 With regards to program uptake, Maine
has the highest license rate of any of the study states with 24,377 licensed individuals,
18.3 per 1,000 residents, by March of 2016.
New Jersey legalized medical marijuana in 2010 and opened its first Alternative
Treatment Center (ATC), the state’s terminology for dispensary, in December of 2012.
22The earliest dispensary opened in May of 2011 and the 8th dispensary opened in December of
2014.
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After shortages due to excess demand the state awarded licenses to two additional
ATC’s that opened in October and November of 2013. As of January 2014 the state
had 2,279 registered patients and by the end of December, had issued 4,228 medical
marijuana licenses. New Jersey differs from other states in that home cultivation is
forbidden and thus ATCs are the only way to legally access medical marijuana.
Rhode Island medical marijuana law was signed in 2006 with the first dispensary
opening in May of 2013. Rhode Island has a 4% sales tax on medical marijuana and
publicly available tax data imply the medical marijuana dispensary sales totaled $6.7
million in the 2013-2014 fiscal year. Rhode Island has also experienced a rapid growth
rate in medical marijuana licensing; from 4,489 licensed patients in 2013 to 11,600
licensed patients in 2014.
Vermont legalized medical marijuana in 2004, extending the conditions for ob-
taining a license to include, among other factors, severe pain and nausea in 2007 and
amended in 2011 to permit up to four licensed dispensaries. The first two dispen-
saries opened in Vermont in June 2013 and over the following two years the number
of licensed patients rose from 800 to 1,754. A state statute, that was passed in 2014,
allowed dispensaries to deliver marijuana, but this statute did not go into effect until
2015.
1.3 Data
The analysis dataset is a 10% random sample of Medicare Part D beneficiaries along
with all of their pharmaceutical purchases from 2011 to 2014. Specifically for these
beneficiaries I observed all filled prescriptions along with demographics and plan char-
acteristics. I aggregated individual opioid purchases to the quarter-year by summing
the day supply of medication received for each beneficiary.23 I identified opioid re-
23The ideal measure of opioid use is morphine equivalent milligrams, the quantity of medication
adjusted by the strength of pain relief. For example, 1 milligram of codeine has the analgesic effect
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placement therapy from prescriptions of buprenorphine with naloxone. This data does
not contain any diagnosis information. To identify the presence of chronic medical
conditions that likely affect opioid use I make use of the fact that many medications
are only prescribed for specific conditions. Specifically I merged Medicare Part D pre-
scription claims with Truven Health Analytics Redbook, which includes a therapeutic
classification for each drug, to infer chronic conditions such as cancer and multiple
sclerosis from the purchase of drugs specific to these conditions. I augmented this
data with a ZIP code level panel data of all dispensaries that open in the Connecti-
cut, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont from 2011 to 2014.24 For ease
of reference I hereafter refer to these 5 states as the “study states.”25
I linked beneficiary’s ZIP code of residence to the ZIP codes where dispensaries
open using the ZIP code Tabulation Area Distance Database provided by Jean Roth
at the National Bureau of Economic Research, which calculates great-circle distances
using the Haversine formula based on internal points in the geographic area. This
link allowed me to compute the “distance to the nearest dispensary in state” for
each beneficiary with distance top coded at 100 miles.26 For my analysis I used two
measures of distance to the nearest dispensary. First, I generated an indicator for the
existence of a dispensary, in state, within 25 miles of the beneficiary. This measure
does not impose an explicit functional form on the relationship between distance and
of 0.15 milligrams of morphine. However the number of pills/tablets/patches/volume of injectables
are not observed in my dataset. Nonetheless in a different 10% random sample of Medicare Part D
beneficiaries, where quantity is observed, from 2006 through 2010 I found a 0.7 correlation between
morphine milligram adjusted quantity and day supply of opioids and thus I am confident that day
supply is a sufficient statistic for units of pain relief.
24Prior to 2011 none of these states had active dispensaries and while there is some exit in 2015
none of the dispensaries that open during my sample go out of business or move during the sample
period.
25Note that in the empirical analysis the study states sample contains both treated beneficiaries
and control beneficiaries as the treatment is local access to dispensaries which varies over time and
across ZIP codes within these states.
26For seniors and disabled travel costs are likely substantial. For example Burgess and DeFiore
(1994) found that veterans significantly decrease their likelihood of seeking medical services for
distances up to 60 miles from a VA clinic.
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access, but fails to account for additional dispensaries opening within 25 miles, once
there exists a nearby dispensary, and for dispensaries opening at distances greater
than 25 miles away. The second is a normalized continuous measure of distance
which I call “closeness”. Closeness is equal to 100 minus the distance to the closest
dispensary in-state, divided by 100. This normalization results in a measure between
zero and one where closeness is equal to 1 when the there exists a dispensary in the
beneficiary’s ZIP code and take on value 0 when the nearest dispensary in state is
at least 100 miles away. Correspondingly closeness takes on a value of 0.5 when the
nearest dispensary is 50 miles from the beneficiary’s ZIP code. This measure also has
its drawbacks as it assumes travel costs are linear within a 100 mile radius. Figure 1·1
shows dispensary access in the study states in 4th quarter of 2014.
The “study states” sample consists of all beneficiaries living in the study states.
See Table 1.6 for the demographic composition of the sample compared to the 10%
sample of all Medicare Part D beneficiaries. In particular beneficiaries living in the
“study states” are 60% female, 38% low income and the average age in the first quarter
of 2011 is 71. Beneficiaries are predominantly located in urban zip codes, 91%, and
in states with medical marijuana laws already in place, 77%, in the first quarter of
2011. Approximately half of beneficiaries live in states with active prescription drug
monitoring programs in the first quarter of 2011.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
First, I tested the hypothesis that access to medical marijuana dispensaries reduces
prescription opioid use. I exploited variation in the timing and location of dispensaries
openings and examined the change in prescription opioid use patterns of Medicare
Part D beneficiaries based on beneficiary’s home to the nearest dispensary in-state.
Given the structure of my data this is a panel difference-in-difference approach. The
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Figure 1·1: Study States: Dispensary Access 4th Quarter of 2014
Notes: Map of counties in study states. Colors represent access as measured by the minimum
distance from a ZIP code in the county to a dispensary in-state measured in miles. The darkest
blue corresponds to counties containing ZIP codes that have at least one dispensary within 25 miles
in the 4th quarter of 2014.
simplest difference-in-difference compares an outcome between two groups over two
time periods with one group receiving a shock/treatment. Identification of the treat-
ment effect is obtained from differences in the post period between the two groups
under the assumption that, had the shock not occurred, the two groups would have
followed the same trend. This “parallel trend” assumption is justified when the two
groups follow similar trends in the pre period. In my data, entry occurs through-
out the analyzed time periods, and as I follow the same individuals quarterly from
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2011 to 2014, individuals living in locations that have yet to receive access serve as
controls for those living in areas where dispensaries open. It is thus the case that
identification is achieved through changes in individual opioid prescription purchases
between beneficiaries in ZIP codes near where dispensaries have opened and those in
ZIP codes far from open dispensaries within a treated state.27
To quantify the impact of access to medical marijuana dispensaries on the prob-
ability of prescription opioid use, I estimated a linear probability panel difference-
in-difference specification using the sample of medicare beneficiaries living in Con-
necticut, Maine, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont. My preferred specification
is
1{Days > 0}it = α + βdit + φi + τst + zip (1.1)
Where the unit of observation is a beneficiary quarter year and 1{Days > 0}it
is an indicator for at least one opioid prescription. dit is a measure of proximity,
either 1{d ≤ 25}, an indicator for the existence of a dispensary in-state within 25
miles of the beneficiary’s ZIP code, or a closeness, a normalized continuous measure
of the distance to the nearest ZIP code in-state containing a dispensary. φi is an per-
son/beneficiary fixed effect capturing person specific, time invariant, characteristics
affecting the probability of opioid use and τst is a state specific time effect capturing
aggregate trends within states over time.28 To account for unobserved local shocks
to beneficiaries living in the same ZIP codes, and the potential for serial correlation
27Also important for identification is that dispensary entry locations were not selected based
on anticipated trends in use, for example if dispensaries entered into locations where beneficiaries
propensity to substitute for opioids for marijuana was the highest then estimates will be downward
biased. However strict regulation over dispensary entry constrains the ability of business owners to
strategically locate, Also the elderly and disabled only represent a share of the potential customers
and it is unlikely that dispensary owners are able to predict differential beneficiary substitution by
location.
28While I have beneficiary demographics, only age exhibits temporal variation, increasing once per
year, and thus all beneficiary demographics are captured in beneficiary fixed effect. See section 1.4.1
for discussion of a model with ZIP code fixed effects and beneficiary characteristics.
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within individuals, standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code.
Using the distance measure closeness, β, the coefficient of interest, is the per-
centage point change in the probability of filling at least one opioid prescription in a
quarter, from a dispensary opening in a beneficiary’s ZIP code, when the beneficiary
previously lived at least 100 miles from the nearest dispensary. This specification as-
sumes a linear travel cost over a 100 mile radius and thus, for a beneficiary previously
living at least 100 miles from the nearest dispensary, the opening of a dispensary 50
miles from the beneficiary induces a 100−50
100
β = β/2 percentage point reduction in the
probability of opioid use in subsequent quarters. Due, in part, to concerns about
non-linear travel costs, and for ease of interpretation, the coefficient β on the binary
measure of access measures the percentage point change in the probability of filling at
least one opioid prescription in a quarter from at least one dispensary within 25 miles
of the beneficiary’s ZIP code of residence as compared to beneficiaries living further
away. Results from these regressions are presented in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.7.
I found that the effect of a dispensary opening within 25 miles of a beneficiary
reduces the probability of opioid prescription by 0.23 percentage points, a 2% decrease
relative to mean probability of use, compared to beneficiaries living further than 25
miles from a dispensary in the same state. Using the linear travel cost specification I
found a 0.37 decrease in the probability of opioid prescription when a dispensary opens
in a beneficiary’s ZIP code and they previously lived at least 100 miles from the nearest
dispensary in-state. While these two estimates come from different assumptions on
the relationship between distance and access they tell a consistent story; access to
medical marijuana dispensaries reduces the probability of opioid prescription among
Medicare Part D beneficiary’s in the study states. As a comparison Columns 1 and
2 of Table 1.7 corresponds to
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1{Days > 0}it = α + βdit + γ1PDMPit + γ2MMLit + φi + τt + zip (1.2)
In this specification, aggregate time trends are assumed to be the same across
study states. The time varying covariates excluded from the previous specification are
the existence of a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMPit) and the existence
of a medical marijuana law (MMLit). Both are included to control for changes in the
probability of use due to restricted access to opioids and pre-dispensary marijuana
access respectively.29 Note that they are not included in the specification with state
specific trends as they vary at the state quarter year and thus are not identified.
In this specification, effects are identified by comparing changes in the probability
of opioid prescription between beneficiaries living in locations close to dispensaries
that open, to beneficiaries that live far from open dispensaries within the collection
of the study states. Estimated effects here will be biased if the difference between
state specific trends and the aggregate trends in the quarterly probability of opioid
prescription correlate with the timing of dispensary entry. The advantage of this
specification is that once a state becomes saturated with dispensaries there become
very few control beneficiaries to compare with those who are treated. In the extreme,
if every beneficiary has access, then the coefficient on access will be a combination
of the treatment effect and the average of the trend in the post period. Notice
that estimates are not particularly sensitive to the inclusion of state specific trends
versus aggregate time trends indicating that neither saturation from the model with
states specific trends, nor the difference in state trends relative to aggregate trends,
29Recall that, prior to dispensary provisions, states with medical marijuana laws require medical
marijuana licensed beneficiaries to produce their own marijuana or to designate a caregiver to pro-
duce on their behalf. Though each of the study states implemented medical marijuana laws prior to
dispensary access not all of the study states had medical marijuana laws by 2011.
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significantly impact the estimated coefficient of interest.30
Having estimated the average change in the probability of opioid use, I next turn
to changes in the quantity used by beneficiaries with opioid prescriptions prior to
access. Measuring prescription opioid use by the day supply of medication from
filled prescriptions, and selecting the sample of beneficiaries that fill at least one
opioid prescription prior to dispensary access, I estimate the following linear panel
difference-in-difference specification
Days Supplyit = α + βdit + φi + τst + zip (1.3)
This specification estimates the change in the quantity of prescription opioids
purchased from access to medical marijuana dispensaries among the pre-access pre-
scription opioid users. Here the identifying assumption is that the change in the
quantity purchased by opioid using beneficiaries, from a dispensary opening nearby,
as compared to the change in quantity purchased by individuals in the same state, but
who live far from open dispensaries, is due to the change in marijuana access. Similar
to the probability of use specification, identification requires that the dispensary lo-
cations and propensity to substitute marijuana for opioids, among prescription opioid
users, are not driven by common unobservables. Results are presented in Columns 1
and 2 of Table 1.8.
I find a 0.73 decrease in the day supply of prescription opioids purchased by
opioid using beneficiaries from a dispensary opening within 25 miles of their residence.
Estimates assuming linear travel costs indicate the effect of a dispensary opening in
a beneficiary’s ZIP code who previously lived at least 100 miles from the nearest
dispensary in state imply a 1.52 decrease in the day supply of prescription opioid
purchases among opioid using beneficiaries. For comparison Columns 3 and 4 of
30See section 1.4.2 for estimates under an alternative identification strategy based on discontinu-
ities in access near the border between study states and states with no dispensary access.
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Table 1.8 show the results from estimating
Days Supplyit = α + βdit + γ1PDMPit + γ2MMLit + φi + τt + zip (1.4)
This specification assume common aggregate trends, identifying the effect of dis-
pensary access on quantity of prescription opioids from difference in quantity pur-
chased between beneficiaries living close to where dispensaries open and those living
further away among the study states. Similar to the results from the probability of
use specifications, the estimates assuming a common time trend indicate lesser ef-
fects then those accounting for state specific trends but results are not substantially
different in magnitude.
For ease of interpretation in the remainder of this section I focus on the binary
measure of access, the existence of at least one dispensary within 25 miles, and with
a slight abuse of notation define “has access” according to this measure. Though
coefficients differ between the two measures of access in the following models they
continue to tell the same story sharing similar magnitude, significance and sign. See
the appendix for results using the closeness measure.
Estimates from both the probability of prescription opioid use and the quantity
purchased by opioid users specifications tell a similar story: access to medical mari-
juana dispensaries reduces prescription opioid use. However if there is heterogeneity
in treatment effects, the average decrease could result from an increase in prescription
opioid use by some and a decrease in opioid use by others. For example, it could be
that heavy opioid users are unaffected by marijuana access and that only the light
users change their opioid prescription behavior or that light users increase their opioid
use but that this effect is swamped by the decrease in use by heavy users.
If I were to assume that opioid prescription patterns were in a steady state, and
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that only prescriptions in the n previous quarters are relevant for an individual’s
opioid use today, I would have estimated a Markovian chain transition matrix for the
pre periods and compare this with transitions post access.31 However, neither of these
assumptions are realistic in the current context. Between policies aimed to combat
the opioid epidemic and shifts in beliefs about proper opioid prescribing practices,
aggregate trends make it clear that we have not reached a steady state in prescription
opioid use. Similarly it is unclear how far back history of opioid use is relevant for
explaining current opioid use. As opioids are addictive it is clear that at least the
recent history is an important predictor of use but evidence that opioid use at a young
age can have a lasting impact on opioid use later in life32 indicates that an opioid
user’s transition path is not likely a Markovian process. Nonetheless it is interesting
to explore how the history of opioid use impacts the effect of dispensary access on
future opioid use.
To assess distributional effects from access to medical marijuana dispensaries I
partitioned beneficiaries into five pre-access types based on their opioid use in the
first quarter of 2011. These five types, which I name None, Light, Light-Moderate,
Moderate-Heavy and Heavy are assigned according to the day supply of opioid use
in the first quarter of 2011. Table 1.1 shows the type cutoffs, abbreviations and the
proportion of beneficiaries in each category. Note that the cutoffs are not arbitrary.
They lie near the quartile of day supply conditional on positive opioid prescription
in most years. Additionally there is an average of 91 days in a quarter and thus the
Heavy users are those with at least one day supply of opioids per day.33 Moderate-
31In particular if it were known that n periods are relevant for current opioid prescription one
could estimate a |state|n Markovian transition matrix, however even for small n the demand on the
data would render precise estimates unlikely given the first n observations of each beneficiary would
need to be excluded from estimation to ensure well defined state space. The methodology would
still require that opioid transition is observed in steady state pre-access.
32Miech et al. (2015).
33It is possible to have more than one day supply per day. In particular this occurs when a
beneficiary fills concurrent opioid prescriptions. While one may want to attribute such high use to
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Heavy users have anywhere from one day supply per two days up to one day supply
per day. Light users have no more than 10 days supply in a quarter and thus are
most likely those who experience an acute injury or undergo surgery rather than
beneficiaries with chronic pain conditions. The None type are those with no opioid
prescriptions in the first quarter of 2011. It is important to note that the None type
should not be thought of as never users but rather as the low likelihood users. Many
of the None type had positive opioid use in subsequent quarters both in ZIP codes
with dispensary access and in ZIP codes without. To ensure that the type definition
does not contaminate estimated effects I drop the first quarter in 2011 from analysis.34
Table 1.1: Pre Access Types
Type Abbreviation Days Supply Prevalence
None 0 0 84.05
Light L [1,10] 4.76
Light-Moderate LM [11,45] 4.16
Moderate-Heavy MH [46,90] 4.59
Heavy H 91+ 2.44
To estimate the distributional effects of access to medical marijuana dispensaries
on the use of prescription opioids I ran a series of panel difference-in-difference models
interacting pre-access type with dispensary access. For each of the five use levels l,
where use levels are defined using the same cutoffs in day supply as pre-types, I
estimate
1{use level = l}it = α + β0dit +
∑
j 6=0
βjdit ∗ 1{pre type = j}+ φi + τst + zip (1.5)
Where j indexes over the pre-types and 0 represents the None pre-type. Benefi-
ciary and state-quarter-year fixed effects control for aggregate trends, person specific
abuse/doctor shopping it is not uncommon of for a heavy opioid user to be prescribed a combination
therapy consisting of concurrent opioid prescriptions.
34Results are similar defining types according to the second quarter of 2011 and dropping both
the first and second quarter of 2011.
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time invariant features and pre-access transition rates.35 To account for the potential
of serial correlation, and that access varies at the ZIP code-quarter-year, standard
errors are clustered at the ZIP code. The coefficients β0 +βj represents the change in
the probability of prescription opioid purchase at use level l from medical marijuana
dispensary access for a pre-type j. Since the type space is exhaustive there is cross
equation restriction that
∑
l(β0 + βj) = 0 for each j. This says that the increase in
the likelihood of a use level from access to medical marijuana dispensaries must be
offset by the decrease in the likelihood of another use level such that the total change
in likelihood must equal zero for each pre-access type. However this restriction is
mechanically satisfied since each equation is estimated via OLS. Estimates from this
specification are presented in Table 1.9. For ease of interpretation I combined the
coefficients from this regression in a matrix resembling a transition matrix in Ta-
ble 1.2. In particular each row represents the beneficiary’s pre-access type and each
column represents a use level. As such the (j, l)th entry represents the change in the
probability of being at use level l from dispensary access for pre-type j.
Table 1.2: Distributional Effects
None Light Light-Mod Mod-Heavy Heavy
None -0.6∗∗∗ 0.0 0.3∗∗∗ 0.1∗ 0.1∗∗∗
Light 2.5∗∗∗ -2.9∗∗∗ -0.9∗∗∗ 0.9∗∗∗ 0.4∗∗
Light-Mod 8.3∗∗∗ -1.0∗∗∗ -8.5∗∗∗ 0.1 1.0∗∗∗
Mod-Heavy 11.9∗∗∗ 1.1∗∗∗ -0.8∗∗ -11.1∗∗∗ -1.1∗∗
Heavy 8.5∗∗∗ 1.3∗∗∗ 0.9∗ 0.2 -10.9∗∗∗
Notes: Table entries constructed from estimates of equation 1.5 presented in Table 1.9. Joint
significance levels * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Entry (j, l) represents the percentage point
change in the likelihood of use level l for pre-type j from dispensary access within 25 miles in state.
Notice that positive numbers in the lower triangle of the matrix represent an
increase in the probability of a lower use level while positive numbers in the upper
35Note that, since each beneficiary is assigned only one pre-type, the base transition rates in the
absence of medical marijuana dispensaries is collinear with the beneficiary fixed effect and thus is
not separately identified.
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triangle represent an increase in the probability of a higher use level. If there were no
heterogeneity in treatment effects by pre-type then, given the aggregate reduction in
the probability of use from estimates of equation 1.1, we would find negative numbers
in the upper triangle and positive numbers in the lower triangle. However Table 1.2
reveals treatment heterogeneity. Much like the aggregate estimates, the heaviest use
pre-types, those with at least 45 days supply of opioids in the first quarter of 2011,
substitute away from opioids after medical marijuana dispensary access within 25
miles. For example the Moderate-Heavy users are 11.9% more likely to have no use
in periods post access than in pre-access periods, and 1.1% less likely to use more
than 90 days supply in a post access period than in a pre-access period. The low
probability users, those with no use in the first quarter of 2011, on the other hand
are 0.6% more likely to have positive opioid use in periods after access than in pre-
access periods. While this entry into prescription opioid use is small, it is statistically
significant and provides evidence that for some people, access to medical marijuana
induces uptake of prescription opioids. These “gateway effects” are present for Light
and Light-Moderate pre-types though for both the decrease in the probability of any
prescription opioid use is larger than the increase in the probability of use at higher
levels.
Having explored aggregate and distributional effects I now turn to the relation-
ship between access to medical marijuana and opioid addiction. Medicare Part D
beneficiaries struggling with opioid dependence can be prescribed opioid replacement
therapy (ORT)36. Access to medical marijuana could have many different effects on
opioid dependence. For example marijuana may help mitigate the discomfort associ-
ated with ORT37 which could lead to more people being willing to initiate opioid use.
36Buprenorphine with naloxone is the only ORT covered by all Medicare Part D plans and common
brand names include Bunavail, Suboxone and Zubsolv. Methadone is an alternative ORT however
it is not covered for the the treatment of opioid dependence by Medicare Part D insurance plans.
37Nausea is a common side effect of ORT and also a common condition for which a beneficiary
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It could also extend the duration of ORT if marijuana sufficiently mitigates the ORT
side effects but does not alter opioid dependence otherwise. Alternatively marijuana
could be a complement to successful quitting with ORT if the two work in tandem
to reduce cravings and mitigate pain. It may also be the case that with marijuana,
beneficiaries become less worried about their opioid dependence, potentially reflecting
a decrease in the disutility of addiction when supplementing opioids with marijuana.
To quantify these effects, following a similar methodology as the distributional
effects, I categorized beneficiaries into three types based on their opioid and ORT pre-
scriptions in the first quarter of 2011. The three types, their abbreviations and preva-
lence in my sample are shown in Table 1.3. In particular those with no opioid prescrip-
tions and no ORT prescriptions in the first quarter of 2011 are pre-dependence-type
None. All beneficiaries that fill at least one ORT prescription are pre-dependence-type
ORT while the remaining beneficiaries with opioid prescriptions are pre-dependence-
type Opioid (opioid without ORT). Note that the None pre-dependence-type ben-
eficiaries are the same set of beneficiaries as None pre-type from the distributional
effects specification.
Table 1.3: Dependence Types
Type Abbreviation Prevalence
None N 84.02
Opioid without ORT O 15.90
Opioid Replacement Therapy (ORT) R 0.08
I then, for each of the three dependence levels l, estimate
1{dep level = l}it = α + βNdit +
∑
j 6=N
βjdit ∗ 1{pre dep = j}+ φi + τst + zip (1.6)
Here j indexes over the pre-dependence-types and N represents the None pre-
can obtain a medical marijuana license in many states.
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dependence-type. Beneficiary and state-quarter-year fixed effects control for aggre-
gate trends, person specific time invariant features and pre-access transition rates.38
To account for the potential of serial correlation and that access varies at the ZIP
code-quarter-year standard errors are clustered at the ZIP code. Results from esti-
mating equation 1.6 are presented in Table 1.10. Similar to Table 1.2, I construct the
percentage point change in probability of dependence levels for pre-dependence types
from the estimates of equation 1.6, dropping the first quarter of 2011, in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Opioid Dependence
None Opioid ORT
None -0.6∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 0.0
Opioid 7.2∗∗∗ -7.3∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
ORT 5.5∗∗∗ 2.7 -8.3∗∗∗
Notes: Table entries constructed using estimate of equation 1.6 presented in Table 1.10. Joint
significance levels * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Entry (j, l) represents the percentage point
change in the likelihood of dependence level l for pre-dependence-type j from dispensary access
within 25 miles in state.
Before interpreting Table 1.4, I remind the reader that the duration of opioid
replacement therapy is highly idiosyncratic. For some beneficiaries the perpetual
use of opioid replacement therapy may be required. For beneficiaries with no opioid
prescriptions in the first quarter of 201139 there is no change in the likelihood of
initiating ORT,40 though this is not surprising as the low likelihood opioid users are
not likely to be opioid dependent. However, insight into the relationship between
marijuana and opioid dependence is apparent from the change in behavior for those
with opioid prescriptions and for those with ORT prescriptions from dispensary access
38Note that, just as with the distributional effects specification, the base transition rates in the
absence of medical marijuana dispensaries are collinear with the beneficiary fixed effect and thus is
not separately identified.
39Note that the first entry of Table 1.4 replicates the the first entry in Table 1.2 since the None
dependence level/type and the None level/type are identical.
40The lack of “statistical significance” of this estimate is not a lack of precision but rather reflects
that a precisely estimated zero is, tautologically not distinct from zero.
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within 25 miles. For those with ORT in the first quarter of 2011 the duration of ORT
is decreased with access to medical marijuana dispensaries. Post access they are
8.3 percentage points less likely to continue with ORT and 5.5 percentage points
more likely to successfully quit. The decreased duration of ORT and the increase
in successful quitting suggest a complementarity between ORT and marijuana in the
treatment of opioid dependence. Similarly among those using prescription opioids
without ORT in the first quarter of 2011 there is a 7.2 percentage point increase
in the probability of no opioid prescriptions and a 0.1 percentage point increase in
the uptake of ORT. While I cannot distinguish between beneficiaries who stopped
opioid use before becoming addicted from those who stopped while addicted, but
before needing to initiate ORT, these results suggest that ORT become both more
appealing and more effective from medical marijuana dispensary access within 25
miles.
Having established the average reduction in prescription opioid use, heterogeneity
in treatment effects by pre-access use and the interaction between medical marijuana
dispensary access and opioid addiction, I explored heterogeneity by demographics in
section 1.4.1 and robustness check in section 1.4.2 before concluding with section 1.5.
1.4.1 Heterogeneity by Demographics
The main specifications estimated in the previous subsection control for person spe-
cific characteristics though the individual fixed effects. Doing so accounts for both
time invariant observables and unobservables. However, one may wish to compare
opioid use by observable demographics. I first explored the importance of demograph-
ics by repeating the base results, estimating the probability of opioid use and the
day supply among pre-access user using pooled cross-section difference-in-difference.
Specifically I estimated
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1{Days > 0}it = α + βdit +Xitγ + φzip + τst + zip (1.7)
With Xit containing age-groups, gender, a measure of income, race and a set of
painful chronic medical conditions. Results are presented in appendix Table A.5.
From this specification we can see that disabled, female, low income whites with
painful chronic medical conditions are the highest likelihood users while elderly, male,
high income asians are the lowest likelihood users. The results of this specification
are informative for comparing the impact of access to the demographic differential in
usage. For example the effect of dispensary access within 25 miles on the probability
of opioid use is comparable to one fifth the gender gap.
I next explored heterogeneity in the effect of access on particular sub groups of
beneficiaries. Estimates from subsample analysis, estimating equation 1.1 for sub-
groups based on demographics and equation 1.3 for the beneficiaries in the subgroup
who use prescription opioids prior to dispensary access, are presented in Table A.6.
Specifically the first subsample results compare the elderly to the disabled. While
this cut of the sample does not result in statistically significant effects, the point esti-
mates, using the binary measure of access, of the change in the probability of opioid
prescription among disabled are twice the estimated effects among the seniors. This
suggests that local proximity had a greater effect on the disabled than on seniors.
Interestingly the linear travel cost specification tells the opposite story, which could
reflect that linear travel costs are more reasonable for the elderly than the disabled.
However, although estimates of the effect of dispensary access on the quantity of
prescription opioids purchased for pre-access users are also not statistically distinct
between the two subsamples, the point estimates suggest that dispensary access has
a greater effect on the disabled than on seniors. This is not surprising as the disabled
population are very likely to qualify for medical marijuana license and may also be
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more open to trying marijuana as a medication. They are also likely to have difficulty
traveling as disabilities can impede physical movement and/or prevent a beneficiary
from being able to drive.
The second pair of subsamples compare the effect of dispensary access on pre-
scription opioid use for the low income subsidy recipients to those with income high
enough to not qualify for income based subsidization. Here the differences are stark.
The low income subsidy recipients subsample estimates are approximately twice as
large as the main results, both in terms of the probability of prescription opioid use
and the quantity of prescription opioids purchased by pre-access users. By contrast
there is a near zero effect on the probability of opioid use among the high income
beneficiaries and substantially smaller reductions in the quantity of opioids purchased
by pre-access users. Taken together these findings indicate that the estimated aggre-
gate substitution is almost entirely being driven by changes in the use of prescription
opioids by low income subsidy recipients.
While this may seem surprising, since beneficiaries must pay the full marginal
price for marijuana and receive insurance discounts for opioids, this is likely in part
due prevalence of pain and differential pre-dispensary barriers to marijuana access.
The low income beneficiaries were twice as likely to use opioids than the higher
income beneficiaries. Also, a beneficiary who obtains a medical marijuana license
prior to dispensary access must either cultivate and produce their own marijuana
or pay someone to cultivate and produce on their behalf. Though a medical license
prevents state litigation it does not require that a landlord allow a tenant to cultivate
marijuana on the landlord’s property. Due to federal illegality it is not in the interest
of a landlord to allow a tenant to grow on their property as the landlord would
be in breach of federal law and could be prosecuted for their tenant’s garden. A
high income beneficiary is much more likely to own their own house and thus can
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cultivate and produce their own marijuana. Similarly the entry cost into cultivation
and production may be insurmountable for a low income beneficiary. Even if the low
income beneficiary can find a friend or family member to cultivate on their behalf
they may not be able to afford the start up cost of cultivation. Once a beneficiary
has set up their own garden or have established a relationship with a caregiver there
is likely little impact from dispensary access. The lower opioid use probabilities
and levels among the higher income beneficiaries may in part reflect that the higher
income beneficiaries were able to surpass the pre-dispensary access barriers and thus
are essentially unaffected by the additional access from a nearby dispensary.
1.4.2 Robustness
For robustness, and to explore an alternative identification strategy, I constructed
two samples, which I name border sample and all state sample. The border sample
consists of beneficiaries living near the border between the study states and the states
they border. Specifically all beneficiaries living within 75 miles of a ZIP code that
contains at least one dispensary by the end of 2014 but who do not live in one of the
study states serve as controls for beneficiaries who live in one of the study states and
within 75 miles of a border with a non-treated state. The all state sample consists of
the study states and all other states that do not have dispensary access at any time
during or before 2014.
Table A.7 provides descriptive statistics for the three samples. Columns 1-3 show
the demographic composition of the study states. Column 1 displays the demograph-
ics of those living in the study states while Column 2 and 3 partitions, among those
living in the study states, those living in ZIP codes that have a dispensary within 25
miles by the end of 2014, in Column 2, vs those living in ZIP codes that do not have
a dispensary within 25 miles by the end of 2014, in Column 3. Note that those who
gain access late in the sample period serve as controls for those who obtain access
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early and thus the difference in final demographic composition between Column 2 and
Column 3 does not accurately represent differences between beneficiaries who gain
access and those used as controls early in the sample period. Columns 4-6 show the
demographic composition of the border sample. Column 4 shows the demographic
composition of beneficiaries in the border sample living in study states while Column
5 shows the demographic composition of beneficiaries in the border sample living in
states with no dispensary access. Similar to the study states sample Columns 7-9
show the demographic composition of beneficiaries in the study states who eventually
obtain access to a dispensary within 25 miles as compared to beneficiaries who do
not, either due to living far from dispensaries in state or living in one of the states
that does not allow medical marijuana dispensaries during or before 2014.
Table A.1 shows the results from estimating equation 1.1, in Columns 3 and 4,
equation 1.2, in Columns 1 and 2, using the border sample. Here the identifying as-
sumption is that beneficiaries who live close to the border of a state with dispensary
access are similar to those living across the border in a state with dispensary access
and thus the difference in the change of the probability of opioid use between bene-
ficiaries living in a state with dispensary access, after a dispensary opens nearby in
their state, reflects the causal effect of dispensary access. Note first that none of the
point estimates are statistically distinct from their counterpart using the study states
sample. However, there is still some interesting distinctions between results using the
border sample and the study states sample. In particular, as seen in Columns 1 and 2,
results assuming a common time trend among the states in the border sample results
in smaller point estimates than those from the study states sample. By contrast, as
seen in Columns 3 and 4, accounting for state specific trends results in larger point
estimates in the border sample. These differences are intuitive, failure to account for
state specific shocks, by assuming a common time trend, induces a bias in the esti-
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mated effect of access, where the coefficient of interest picks up a combination of the
differential effect due to access and the difference in state specific shocks. However,
once accounting for state specific trends, differences in beneficiaries behavior across
the border are driven by differential access. The larger point estimates, compared to
the study states, likely correspond to the the fact that, unlike the study states sam-
ple, beneficiaries living in states without dispensary access cannot utilize dispensaries
regardless of their willingness to travel. Estimates in the study states sample provide
a lower bound on the effects of access as both distance based measures assume that
beneficiaries living far from dispensaries, in study states, do not have access. However
beneficiaries may be willing to travel hundreds of miles to obtain access.
Similar to Table 1.8 for the study states sample, Table A.2 shows the results from
estimating equation 1.3, in Columns 3 and 4, equation 1.4, in Columns 1 and 2,
from beneficiaries in the border sample who fill at least one opioid prescription prior
to access. Again estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the treated state
sample and slightly larger in magnitude.41
1.4.3 Back of the Envelope Calculation
Just how big of an impact is a 2% change in the probability of quarterly opioid
use, relative to mean probability of use, from dispensary access? To provide context I
draw on estimates from Kilby (2016). The author finds that, among beneficiaries with
employer sponsored health insurance, prescription drug monitoring programs induced
an 11.1% decrease in the use of opioids and a 12.5% decrease in overdose deaths,
relative to mean usage and death rates, quarterly. These two estimates provide a
coarse mapping from opioid use to probability of death.42 Though these estimates
41Estimates from the all state sample tell a similar story, however estimates from this sample are
not well identified. Results available by request.
42Indeed Kilby (2016) finds that using PDMPs as an instrument for changes in opioid use on the
probability of overdose results in similar estimates.
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come from a different population they are still informative, even if mean usage are
different between the two populations, so long as the percent relative to mean changes
are comparable. I calibrate the age adjusted death rate from the US Department of
Health and Human Services: National Vital Statistics Reports of 0.72% annual deaths
and life expectancy of 78.8 years in 2014. These values, along with the average age in
sample (70.7 for observed access, 70.7 for study states and 69.5 for all states), provide
a mapping from marijuana dispensary access to life years saved. Combining life
years saved with the Food and Drug Administration’s $100,000 Value of a Statistical
Life Year indicate 1272 life years were saved amounting to $127 million value. Had
everyone in the US gained dispensary access the total life years saved would have been
55,995 or $5.6 billion value, assuming similar substitution in the non-study states.
These calculations likely underestimate the savings as I assume that beneficiaries die
at life expectancy, do not account for new people aging into Medicare Part D or
becoming disabled, and do not account for other benefits such as reduced resources
needed to treat opioid addiction or quality of life improvements.
Table 1.5: Lives Saved From Dispensary Access Within 25 Miles
Population Total Anual Years Total Life Value of
(Gain Access) People Lives Saved Remaining Years Saved Life Years Saved
Observed Access 965,160 157 8.1 1,272 $127,170,000
Study States 1,256,770 205 8.2 1,681 $168,100,000
All States 37,000,000 6,021 9 55,995 $5,599,530,000
Notes: Estimates calibrated from $100,000 Value of Statistical Life Year (Food and Drug Ad-
ministration), Life expectancy of 78.8, and age adjusted annual death rate of 0.72% (US De-
partment of Health and Human Services: National Vital Statistics Reports) in 2014. Dispen-
sary within 25 miles leads to 2% reduction to mean use of opioids (This paper) and 11.1% re-
duction to mean use of opioids leads to 12.5% reduction to mean overdose deaths (Kilby, 2016).
Life years saved =
∑
years remaining(
∂Opioid Use
∂Dispensary Access )(
∂Opioid Death Rate
∂Opioid Use )(Death rate)(Population).
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper estimates the impact of access to medical marijuana on the use of pre-
scription opioids among Medicare Part D beneficiaries. The entry, and subsequent
presence, of dispensaries near beneficiary’s residence provides inter-temporal, within
state, variation in local access to medical marijuana, which this paper exploits. The
findings are threefold. First, there is net aggregate reduction in the probability of
prescription opioid use, and in the quantity used by pre-access users, from local dis-
pensary access. Second, there is heterogeneity in the effect of local dispensary access
with substantial substitution for the heaviest opioid users and small complementarity
for the lightest users. Third, there is greater uptake of, and higher cessation rate
with, opioid replacement therapy from access to medical marijuana dispensaries.
Expanding access to marijuana is much less costly for state government and federal
governments, compared to policies restricting access to opioids, or expanding access
to medication assisted treatment. Most of the costs of establishing dispensary access
fall on the private business owners. Despite substantial barriers to entry, firms have
entered in each market, with the number of businesses applying to open dispensaries
often in excess of state limits. The entry, and subsequent lack of exit, indicates
that dispensaries are profitable, and thus, do not require subsidization. Additionally,
beneficiaries who substitute marijuana for opioids pay the full price of marijuana
lowering the burden on insurers, who pay the majority of the cost of beneficiaries
opioids, thereby reducing the federal government’s burden of subsidizing Medicare
Part D.
However, just as restricting access to opioid can cause negative externalities, ex-
panding access to marijuana also induces a potentially negative externality; in par-
ticular the uptake of opioids among previously low likelihood users. Greater access
to medical marijuana, via dispensaries, leads some low likelihood users to start using
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opioids and may have a similar “gateway effects” on other, potentially illegal or more
harmful, drugs. This raises the question should policymakers worry about marijuana
“gateway effects”? To answer this question requires an understanding of the relation-
ship between the interaction of marijuana and opioids. If the use of marijuana induces
a demand for altered states then even small uptake of opioids could be worrisome as it
may be a signal of an uptake in illicit state altering drugs, for which measurement of
such effects is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if the observed “gateway ef-
fects” are driven by complementarity between marijuana and opioids in the treatment
of pain, then it may be the case that the uptake in opioids, post marijuana access,
is driven by those who would have used opioids, if not for the disutility/discomfort
of opioid side effects, who are now able to mitigate the side effects of opioids with
marijuana. If the observed entry into opioid use reflects the benefits of the combina-
tion therapy, rather than a change in preference for opioids, then such entry can be
welfare improving and need not be considered a negative externality.
Additionally this paper explores the effect of access to medical marijuana dispen-
saries on the use of prescription opioids among a particular population, the elderly
and disabled. The effect of access to medical marijuana may be different for the em-
ployed population and for the youth.43 Future research is needed to understand the
effect of access to medical marijuana on the children and the working class to asses
the overall impact of access to medical marijuana on prescription opioid use.
Similarly, the findings of this paper do can help with regulators in determining
where to allow dispensaries to open when implementing medical marijuana dispensary
access. Specifically locating dispensaries where opioid use is most prevalent can help
reduce use among the users, by contrast dispensaries should not be located in areas
with little to no opioid use as entry effect will likely dominate the reduction among
43For example Smart (2015) finds reduced opioid poisoning, from increased supply of marijuana,
among the elderly but also finds an increase in drunk driving accidents among the youth.
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users in areas with light opioid use.
With several states already allowing for recreational use of marijuana, and others
voting on allowing such access, it will be important to understand marijuana-opioid
substitution in the absence of a medical license barrier to access. While one may be
tempted to scale up the estimates put forth in this paper, perhaps by some measure of
the barrier to access induced by licensing, it is not obvious that recreational access will
have similar effects. For example it may be the case the medical marijuana licensing
process selects a particular subset of the population whose behavioral response to
dispensary access may differ from an individual who is likely to use marijuana with
recreational access but unlikely to register for a medical marijuana license.
These findings provide context for the current controversy over marijuana as a
substitute pain medication versus a gateway to harder drugs. While I find evidence
supporting both sides of the argument, substitution dominates complementarity sug-
gesting that, on net, gateway concerns are likely second order compared to the benefits
of substitution, indicating that access to medical marijuana dispensaries is likely a
positive force in combating the opioid epidemic.
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Table 1.6: Analysis Sample Composition Compared to 10% Part D
Sample
Q1 2011 Study States All States
Demographics
Male 0.40 0.41
(0.49) (0.49)
Age 70.6 69.5
(13) (12.9)
Urban 0.91 0.84
(0.28) (0.37)
Low Income 0.38 0.36
(0.49) (0.48)
PDMP 0.49 0.58
(0.48) (0.49)
MML 0.77 0.07
(0.41) (0.25)
Race
White 81.9 80.7
Black 10.3 12.6
Hispanic 3.2 2.9
Asian 2.1 1.6
Other 2.6 2.2
Conditions
Cancer 0.012 0.013
(0.111) (0.114)
MS 0.003 0.001
(0.046) (0.038)
Fibromyalgia 0.026 0.028
(0.159) (0.164)
Arthritis 0.013 0.013
(0.113) (0.115)
Shingles 0.010 0.011
(0.098) (0.104)
HIV 0.003 0.004
(0.056) (0.061)
Liver Failure 0.007 0.008
(0.084) (0.088)
N 125,677 2,031,749
Notes: Treated sample consists of all beneficiaries from the 10% Medicare Part D extract who live
in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. The all states sample consists of beneficiaries living on one of the
aforementioned states or in states with no dispensary access prior to 2015.
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Table 1.7: Probability of Prescription Opioid Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0}
Closeness -0.14 -0.37∗
(0.10) (0.20)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.19∗∗ -0.23∗∗
(0.081) (0.11)
PDMP 0.24∗ 0.23∗
(0.13) (0.13)
MML 0.35∗∗ 0.33∗∗
(0.16) (0.16)
Constant 11.7∗∗∗ 11.7∗∗∗ 15.0∗∗∗ 15.1∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (2.18) (2.17)
Person FE X X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X
Obs 2,007,160 2,007,160 2,007,160 2,007,160
y¯ 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0
R2a 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for filling at least one opioid prescription, scaled
by 100, thus coefficients represent a percentage point change in the likelihood of at least one opioid
prescription from a one unit increase in the right hand side variable. MML is an indicator for the
existence of a state medical marijuana law and PDMP is an indicator for the existence of a state
prescription drug monitoring program. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011 to 2014
and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.8: Day Supply of Prescription Opioids Among Pre-Access
Users
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days Supply Days Supply Days Supply Days Supply
Closeness -0.23 -1.52∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.33)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.43∗∗∗ -0.73∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.22)
PDMP 2.09∗∗∗ 2.05∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.37)
MML 2.46∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.39)
Constant 15.3∗∗∗ 15.4∗∗∗ 9.21 9.96∗
(0.42) (0.42) (6.04) (6.04)
Person FE X X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X
Obs 684,512 684,512 684,512 684,512
y¯ 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6
R2a 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
Notes: Dependent variable is the day supply of prescription opioids from filled prescriptions during
the quarter-year. MML is an indicator for the existence of a state medical marijuana law and PDMP
is an indicator for the existence of a state prescription drug monitoring program. Observations are
beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011 to 2014 and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT,
ME, NJ, RI and VT who filled at least one opioid prescription before having a dispensary within
100 miles of them. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.9: Change in Transition Rates From Dispensary Access
Within 25 Miles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Use Light Use Light-Mod Mod-Heavy Heavy Use
0 [1,10] [11,45] [46,90] 90+
1{d ≤ 25} -0.60∗∗∗ 0.041 0.33∗∗∗ 0.11∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.077) (0.070) (0.058) (0.044)
#1{pre type = L} 3.08∗∗∗ -2.91∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.43) (0.32) (0.29) (0.21) (0.11)
#1{pre type = LM} 8.93∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -8.80∗∗∗ 0.035 0.86∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.32) (0.53) (0.46) (0.27)
#1{pre type = MH} 12.5∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗
(0.60) (0.19) (0.45) (0.72) (0.53)
#1{pre type = H} 9.06∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.057 -11.0∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.20) (0.33) (0.79) (0.87)
Constant 83.5∗∗∗ 5.45∗∗∗ 5.38∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗ 1.28
(2.18) (1.22) (1.72) (1.20) (1.28)
Person FE X X X X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X X X X
Obs 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483
y¯ 87.0 4.09 3.21 3.41 2.34
R2a 0.51 0.068 0.23 0.49 0.59
Notes: Dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, in Column 2 is
an indicator for [1,10] day supply of opioids, in Column 3 is an indicator for [11,45] day supply of
opioids, in Column 4 is an indicator for [46,90] day supply of opioids and in Column 5 is an indicator
for at least 91 day supply of opioids in the quarter-year. In each Column the dependent variable is
scaled by 100 and thus coefficients represent the percentage point change in the likelihood of the day
supply of prescription opioids being at the Columns use level from a one unit increase in the right
hand side variable. Beneficiary pre-types are defined according to opioid prescriptions in the first
quarter of 2011, using the aforementioned cutoffs, and #1{pre type = τ} is the interaction between
and pre-type τ and the indicator for a dispensary within 25 miles of the beneficiary, 1{d ≤ 25}. The
omitted interaction is the no opioid prescription pre-type. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-
years from the second quarter of 2011 through 2014 and the sample consists of beneficiaries living
in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis.
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 1.10: Change in Uptake and Efficacy of ORT: Dispensary Ac-
cess Within 25 Miles
(1) (2) (3)
No Use Opioid Replacement
1{d ≤ 25} -0.60∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.12) (0.11) (0.014)
#1{pre dep = O} 7.80∗∗∗ -7.94∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.046)
#1{pre dep = R} 6.15∗∗∗ 2.14 -8.28∗∗∗
(2.15) (1.84) (2.57)
Constant 83.3∗∗∗ 15.5∗∗∗ 1.12
(2.19) (2.29) (0.68)
Person FE X X X
State Quarter-Year FE X X X
Obs 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483
y¯ 87.0 12.9 0.19
R2a 0.51 0.50 0.73
Notes: Dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, in Column 2 is an
indicator for at least one opioid prescription and no opioid replacement therapy prescriptions (ORT)
and in Column 3 is an indicator for at least one ORT prescription. In each Column the dependent
variable is scaled by 100 and thus coefficients represent the percentage point change in the likelihood
of no opioid prescriptions in Column 1, of at least one opioid prescription but no ORT prescriptions
in Column 2 and of at least one ORT prescription in Column 3 from a one unit increase in the
right hand side variable. Beneficiary pre-dependence-types are defined according to prescriptions
in the first quarter of 2011, using the aforementioned categories, and #1{pre dep = τ} is the
interaction between and pre-dependence-type τ and an indicator for a dispensary within 25 miles of
the beneficiary, 1{d ≤ 25}. The omitted interaction is the no opioid prescription pre-dependence-
type. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from the second quarter of 2011 through 2014 and
the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Chapter 2
Take Your Pills: The Benefits Of
Adherence
Health is a precious resource. Sickness is unpleasant, costly and often unavoidable.
Chronic conditions such as cholesterol imbalance, diabetes, and hypertension require
treatment to maintain good health. For individuals suffering from chronic conditions
maintenance medication is a health investment. Health is also affected by day-to-day
activities such as dietary choices and exercise. Diet, exercise and medication regularity
are linked choices making it difficult to estimate the benefits of medication. To the
best of my knowledge this is the first paper to use instrumental variable estimates to
explore the causal relationship between statin consumption and medical costs.
With a typical good, a consumer purchases the good until the benefit to cost ratio
becomes less than that of alternatives. However, if consumers suffer from bias or
other behavioral issues, such as forgetfulness or laziness, then consumers may cease
to purchase at a point where the benefit to cost ratio still exceeds alternatives, a
phenomenon described as “behavioral hazard” in the context of health choice by
Baicker et al. (2015). Insurance can help mitigate this issue by lowering the out-of-
pocket price consumers must pay, but with strong enough bias, under-consumption
can still be an issue. Manning et al. (1987) and Brot-Goldberg et al. (2015) find that
consumers reduce utilization of cost effective care in the face of cost sharing, indicating
that insurers influence consumer’s choices through their plan features. Insurers face
mixed incentives; on the one hand increased generosity through reduced cost share
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may attract high cost enrollees and will increase insurer expenditures per prescription
fill. On the other hand, increased generosity may reduce the insurers expenditure on
other medical costs associated with their enrollees. These drug offsets, such that
spending on drugs reduces spending on non-drug medical services, have been found
in both employer sponsored health insurance (Chandra et al., 2010), (Gaynor et al.,
2007) and in Medicare part D (McWilliams et al., 2011). The Congressional Budget
Office reports a 1 percent increase in drug consumption reduces non-drug medical
consumption by 0.2 percent (CBO, 2012). Insurers are not blind to this tradeoff. Starc
and Town (2016) find that Medicare Part D insurers who cover both pharmaceutical
and medical costs spend more on drugs and offer more generous drug coverage than
insurers who only cover pharmaceutical costs. They also point out that enrollee
turnover affects the incentives to invest in enrollee health when drug consumption
has a long term or lagged effect on non-drug medical costs. Similarly Fang and
Gavazza (2011) find higher pharmaceutical utilization in plans with higher retention.
Estimated drug offsets in the literature look at contemporaneous changes in total
pharmaceutical and other medical expenses but medication can have a lasting effect
and offset dynamics can differ by drug. The adverse effects of under-consumption are
exacerbated when treatments have long term health benefits as under-consumption
can lead to increased costs both contemporaneously and in the future.
This study explores the relationship between poor compliance with treatment
guidelines, hereafter termed adherence, and future medical costs. The study con-
tributes to a recent body of literature that argues in favor of the importance of patient
preferences in explaining medical expenditures. For instance, Finkelstein et al. (2016)
examine geographic variation in health care utilization exploiting differences in pre
and post utilization among Medicare patients who migrate. They find that patient’s
health explains a substantial share of the geographic variation in health care utiliza-
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tion suggesting that both patient preferences and unmeasured health differences can
play an important role in determining health care costs. Infrequent and irregular
medical treatments are not ideal for understanding health investment decisions as
they may simply be responding to shocks rather than making an investment decision.
In order to estimate a relationship between health investment and future costs the
investment decision must be frequent, regular and observable in the data. Further
under-consumption must be clearly defined. For many treatments, benefits may be
heterogeneous and low levels of consumption may simply reflect low benefit, with no
bias necessary.
This paper focuses on a specific class of medications known commonly as statins1.
Statin medications, for the management of cholesterol imbalance2 and the prevention
of heart attacks and strokes, are an ideal treatment for analyzing the relationship
between health investment and economic outcomes. Statins have clear homogenous
treatment guidelines. They must be taken daily and indefinitely. Discontinuation of
the use of statins results in depletion of the active ingredient in the body exacerbating
cholesterol imbalance and is thus not recommended absent unbearable side effects,
(Colivicchi et al., 2007). Statins improve cholesterol balance and reduce the likelihood
of heart attacks and strokes. There is, however, a lack of benefit salience: one does not
feel any change in the probability of a rare event. Low benefit salience and required
regularity of treatment make statins a likely candidate for poor adherence (Chandra
et al., 2010). Additionally, heart attacks and strokes are expensive conditions to
1More technically known as HMG-CoA reductase enzyme inhibitors. Over 28 million Americans
suffer from cholesterol imbalance and regulate their cholesterol though the use of statins, (Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), 2012). Further, statin usage is on the rise, especially among
those 65 and older. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) estimates that 17.7 percent of adults aged
18-64 used statins in 2014. This is a near doubling in the percentage of Americans between 18 and
64 that use statins compared to the 1990’s, (CDC, 2014). The number of users is likely to continue
to rise with the implementation of the 2013 American Heart Association (AHA) update to treatment
guidelines which expands the criteria for initiating statin treatment to include all individuals over
the age of 75, regardless of health status.
2Also referred to as hyperlipemia
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treat thus there is a clear conduit for potential cost ramifications of poor adherence.
Despite clear treatment guidelines, poor adherence is prevalent, (Ellis et al., 2004).
Evidence of non-negligible price sensitivity and costly non-compliance suggest
statin consumption is not optimal. Heart attacks and strokes are manifestations of
cardiovascular disease and they are expensive. According to the Center for Disease
Control the total direct and indirect cost of cardiovascular disease in the United
States for 2010 was estimated to be $315.4 billion. Even excluding the indirect costs,
total inpatient hospital cost for coronary vascular disease amounted to $71.2 billion
in 2010. Cardiovascular disease alone accounted for approximately one-fourth of the
total cost of inpatient hospital care in the United States in 2010 (Go et al., 2014).
Regular exercise, eating a healthy diet, and complying with statin medication are
all-important for cholesterol management. Absent data on the health activities, such
as diet and physical activity it is not clear if the more adherent tend to partake in
good or bad health activities. Statin adherence is a behavioral choice and correlation
between adherence and other health behavior can bias estimates of the drug’s effect.
To estimate the causal affect of adherence on medical costs, I employ an instru-
mental variable approach exploiting variation in sample side effect rates by statin.3
The idea behind using this instrument is that medications that are more likely to
result in side effects among demographically similar people will be more likely to be
under-adhered to but that, other than through the conduit of adherence, the drug
specific side effect rates do not affect medical costs. As discussed below in section
IV.B, the key identification is that direct expenditures on side effects are not included
3Though statin medication is relatively safe, and side effects are few and incredibly rare, statins
have been associated with liver damage, muscle pain and damage, (US Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), 2014). In fact there were no instances of Rhabdomyolysis (muscle damage) in sample
thus I rely on liver damage incidence. Each statin is associated with the same set of side effects
though they differ in their side effect rates by age and by gender. The presence of a side effect does
not imply that a patient should discontinue statin treatment. Rather discontinuation should only
occur when side effects are severe.
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in expenditure measures and that these rates are calculated within demographically
similar individuals, as opposed to using individual side effect incidence.
The main finding of this study is that an additional 30-day prescription fill is
causally associated with a one percent savings in in the following years’ total medical
cost and with nearly identical percent reductions in out-of-pocket expenditures. These
results are robust to various modifications of my baseline IV model, including the
exclusion of diabetics4, the removal of full and null adherent, and the exclusion of
time, location and plan-type-year fixed effects.
The results described above measure expenditure excluding all purchases of statins.
However, an additional, interesting finding from the analysis is that if statin purchases
are included in the overall expenditure, then despite the mechanical increase in costs
from purchasing statins, estimated savings from statin adherence are larger when
statin costs are included in expenditure measures. This counterintuitive result can
only occur when the more adherent statin users consume medications that are sub-
stantially cheaper than the less adherent statin users. This indeed turns out to be the
case in the sample analyzed. This finding suggests that price sensitivity may be a non-
negligible factor driving poor adherence. Using price sensitivity estimates from the
literature and model estimates, I find that reduced cost share on statin medications
could lead to long term cost savings on behalf of insurers. Importantly, the bene-
fits to reduced cost share are only found after instrumenting for adherence and thus
insurers examining the association between their enrollees statin consumption and
medical costs may have found no measurable reduction, as is the case with my OLS
estimates, thereby failing to fully internalize the benefits of increased compliance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a review of the
literature on adherence and costs, section 3 describes the data, section 4 describes
4Diabetes also requires regular treatment and as adherence may be correlated between medica-
tions the removal of diabetics ensures results are not driven by diabetics
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the methodology and results and section 5 is the conclusion.
2.1 Related Research
A formal model of health as an investment was first introduced by Grossman (1972).
Grossman saw health as an investment that pays in quality of life and extended length
of life. In the Grossman model health differs from other human capital investments
in that health stock determines the amount of time an individual has to produce,
as opposed to, determining the rate of productivity. Grossman’s model illustrates
how old age and poor health can induce a higher shadow price of health resulting in
low levels of health investment. Low levels of health investment can be optimal in
Grossman’s model for two reasons. If one’s health is poor then the change in health
stock from investment may not induce enough change in quality of life to offset the
cost, in this sense the cost to benefit ratio is too low. The second, and perhaps more
troubling cause of underinvestment, is that when an individual expects persistent poor
quality of life they may choose to under invest to shorten their life span. Further if
poor quality of life or worsening ones health in an attempt to shorten ones life impose
a cost on society then Grossman’s model shows that individuals’ decision may not
be socially efficient. Health investment can also be inefficient if consumers are not
able to accurately assess benefits. Baicker et al. (2015) illustrate how consumers with
biased beliefs may under or over consume medical treatment. Baicker et al. discuss
how behavioral hazards such as lack of benefit salience, forgetfulness and myopia can
induce sub optimal health treatment.
Drug offsets, reduced medical expenditures corresponding to increased pharma-
ceutical expenditures, can be substantial. Gaynor et al. (2007) find that after an
increase in cost share 35 percent of expenditure reductions in prescription drugs are
offset by increases in other spending for Medicare beneficiaries. Glazer and McGuire
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(2012) develop a welfare measure of offset effects in health insurance illustrating the
importance of accounting for offsets in contract design. Offsets are particularly trou-
bling when pharmaceutical and medical costs are covered by different insurers as
Chandra et al. (2010) find that supplemental insurers covering drug costs for Medi-
care recipients reduced generosity thereby reducing their own cost but increasing the
costs of traditional Medicare.
Several papers explore the association between adherence and medical costs gen-
erally finding negative correlation.5 However, adherence is a measure of behavior and
thus may be correlated with other health behaviors such as diet and exercise that are
typically unobservable in claims data. The effects of unobservable choices on medical
cost are non negligible. Olson et al. (2015) find that lack of exercise is predictive of
poor self-reported health. According to the WHO data sources, the economic costs
of physical inactivity were estimated to account for 1.5 percent to 3.0 percent of total
direct healthcare expenditures in developed countries such as the United States, (Go
et al., 2014). In a study similar to this, Stuart et al. (2015) find that controlling
for healthy adherer bias reduced estimated savings from diabetes medication adher-
ence. A priori it is reasonable to believe that statin medication adherence could be
associated with good or bad unobservable health behavior and thus is an empirical
question.
Understanding the determinants of a health investment decision is useful to pol-
icy makers and health insurers alike. Fang and Gavazza (2011) find that employee
turnovers lead to dynamic inefficiencies in health investment suggesting that employment-
based health insurance system in the U.S. might lead to an inefficient low level of indi-
vidual health during individuals’ working ages. Duggan and Morton (2008) estimate
the impact of Medicare Part D on pharmaceutical prices and utilization in the US find-
5(Stuart et al., 2015), (Pittman et al., 2011), (Piette et al., 2004) and (Mojtabai and Olfson,
2003) for example.
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ing that Medicare Part D induced lower prices and higher demand. They attribute the
price reduction to the use of formularies, restricted choice set over medications, that
help enrollees determine substitutes thereby inducing more elastic demand. Horne
and Weinman (1999) find that patient’s beliefs about the necessity and the benefits of
their medications is a more powerful predictor of adherence than socio-demographic
factors. Patients are more likely to adhere to medication with salient immediate
effects, such as painkillers for migraines, than they are to medications that reduce
the likelihood of infrequent adverse events, such as statins for heart attacks. Cutler
and Everett (2010) discuss many factors that affect adherence, including lifestyle,
psychological issues, health literacy, support systems, and side effects of medications.
They suggest several methods for increasing adherence, including reducing cost share.
De Vera et al. (2014) review literature on the effects of under compliance to statin
medication on coronary vascular disease. This literature finds significant increase in
morbidity rates associated with poor compliance.
Of all the factors that affect adherence, the out-of-pocket price a consumer must
pay is perhaps the easiest observable tool that is available to insurers to induce changes
in behavior. Several authors explore the relationship between out-of-pocket price for
pharmaceuticals, drug compliance and health outcomes. Hepke et al. (2004) estimate
the effect of changes in out-of-pocket price on adherence to diabetic medication in a
population of enrollees similar to those analyzed in this paper.6 They find increased
compliance from reduced cost share resulting in insignificant effects on total expen-
ditures, but a significant reduction in the number of both hospital and emergency
department visits. Tamblyn et al. (2001) show that an increase in cost sharing for
prescription drugs in elderly people and welfare recipients is followed by reduction
in the use of essential medication and higher rates of serious adverse health shocks,
and a higher frequency of emergency department visits. Karaca-Mandic et al. (2013)
6Employer sponsored health insurance recipients under 65 years of age
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estimate a substantial elasticity of adherence for statin drugs among Medicare Part D
beneficiaries. Lillard et al. (1999) looks at the effect of increasing insurance coverage
for prescription drugs and find the probability of use increases, but overall has no
effect on total expenditures.
There are many health factors that determine medical costs and statin adherence
is only one of them. To control for differences in health care spending that can be
attributed to demographics and underling health status this paper employed DXCG
diagnosis based risk adjusting, the state of the art method for medical cost prediction.
Risk adjustment uses patient’s demographics and medical history to calculate risk
scores. A risk score is a measure of health status that is highly predictive of health
care expenditures see (Van de Ven and Ellis, 2000) and (Ash and Ellis, 2012).
Benefits from adherence to statins are found to be cumulative over the duration of
treatment, (Cheung et al., 2004). An individual experiencing an adverse health shock
is likely to modify their contemporaneous behavior. Comparison of adherence and
concurrent costs or conditions is likely to suffer from simultaneity bias. For example,
an individual may increase adherence in response to experiencing a heart attack. To
avoid the simultaneity issue, and consistent with the delayed benefits, all analysis
compares adherence to costs and conditions in the following year.
2.2 Data
The data set analyzed is an extract from Truven Health MarketScan R© Research
Databases. The MarketScan databases contain individual level, de-identified, health-
care claims information from privately insured employers, health plans and hospi-
tals. Data from individual patients is integrated from all providers of care, capturing
healthcare utilization and cost information at the patient level.
I identify health conditions from International Statistical Classification of Diseases
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and Related Health Problems codes (ICD-9 codes) on individual claims and statins
by their national drug codes (NDC). Individual claims are aggregated to person year
observations for analysis. The individuals analyzed are statin purchasers. As is the
case with most treatments some people may have immediate adverse reactions such as
allergies or poor interaction with other medication. For these individuals immediate
discontinuation is expected and should not be considered poor adherence. Removing
all individuals who make less then two statin purchases, are pregnant at any point
in the sample or were 18 years of age or younger in 2007 results in 400,062 people
observed from 2007 to 2012.7
I collect demographics information including age, gender and location at the three
digit employee zip code8 for each person in each year. The likelihood of cholesterol
issues increases with age and the sample analyzed reflects this with a mean age of 51
and median age of 53 see Figure 2·3. Males comprise 56 percent of the sample.
Health plan information includes plan type9, payment information and whether
or not the individual is the policyholder. 70 percent of individuals are policyholders
receiving insurance directly from their employer and nearly 70 percent of individuals
are enrolled in health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations.
I add all expenditures made in a year on pharmaceuticals, on outpatient visits
and during hospitalizations to attain the total annual medical cost of each individual,
excluding expenditure on statins and excluding liver related expenditure.10 Hereafter
7Note that the age restriction is not binding, there are no enrollees taking statins bellow 21 years
of age in sample.
8The data does not contain zip codes for 2011 or 2012. For 2011 I impute zip codes assuming
that so long as the individual did not change Metropolitan Statistical Area from 2010 to 2011 then
their 2011 zip code remains the same as their 2010 zip codes. Since all outcome variables are next
year’s outcomes 2012 zip codes are not needed.
9Health plan types include comprehensive health plans, exclusive provider organizations, health
maintenance organizations, point of service, preferred provider organizations, preferred provider
organizations with capitation, consumer directed health plans, and high deductible health plans.
10The instrument for adherence is only valid so long as side effect prevalence does not directly effect
medical costs. To ensure this, all medical expenditure on a calendar days that included a diagnosis
consistent with having a liver side effect are not included in expenditures measure. Similarly, any
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this is referred to as total medical cost. Similarly the individual’s out-of-pocket cost
is totaled by adding together all the payments by the individual for medical services,
such as copayments, coinsurance and deductibles again excluding expenditure on
statins and on liver related expenditures.11 This measure is labeled as total out-
of-pocket. Average total expenditures for an enrollee are $8,300 with an average
out-of-pocket of $1,060. Statin out-of-pocket expenditures average $125 with median
out-of-pocket of $75 and average total statin expenditures $540 per year with a median
of $325.
I process individual health information into risk scores and health shock inci-
dence. I compute risk scores for the entire sample of continuously enrolled individ-
uals in MarketScan from demographics and ICD-9 codes using Verisk Helath’s HCC
risk adjustment software.12,13 The average risk score in the sample analyzed is 1.97
indicating that the sample is on average almost twice as costly, in expectation, as a
typical MarketScan enrollee.
I construct indicators for the presence of heart attacks, strokes and liver issues
from diagnosis codes on individual claims. Statin health benefits are derived through
cholesterol management leading to reductions in cholesterol related morbidities. The
primary function of statins is reducing the likelihood of coronary heart disease that
can result in heart attacks and strokes. 5.5 percent of statin users experience at least
medications that can be used to treat a liver damage are excluded from pharmaceutical cost. However
estimates including these expenditures do not differ significantly from the main estimates.
11Excluding plan premiums
12A risk score is a measure derived from patient characteristics and diagnoses over set time frame,
in this paper the calendar year. Risk scores are a highly predictive measure of health care costs.
Risk scores are used by Medicare to calculate transfers from insurers with healthy enrollees to those
with sicker enrollees in an effort to de-incentivize designing contracts that attract enrollees with low
expected cost and detour enrollees with high expected cost, a practice often referred to as cream
skimming, (Ellis, 2008).
13I construct rich concurrent risk scores using the full set of diagnosis. Risk scores can be calculated
concurrently, using within year diagnosis, or prospectively, using prior year diagnosis. Concurrent
risk scores capture costs associated with acute events, such as heart attacks, and thus tend to perform
better than prospective risk scores at predicting total cost. Analysis using prospective risk scores
was conducted as a robustness check, results are similar and available by request.
57
one heart attack or other acute coronary heart disease incidence during the sample
period and 1 percent sufferer from at least one stroke.
Finally I infer statin consumption from filled prescriptions. I measure adherence
as the percentage of days in a calendar year where the patient has access to statin
medication. For example, if an individual purchased a 30-day supply on January 6th
then, unless hospitalized, I assume the individual ran out of mediation on February
5thth. Figure 2·1 shows an example construction of first year adherence.14 When
hospitalized the hospital provides the medication so days hospitalized are accounted
for in calculating adherence.15 Figure 2·2 shows the distribution of adherence in the
sample. Notice there is substantial mass of under-adherers.
Statins are packaged in 30, 60, and 90 day supplies. The majority of statin
purchases are made at pharmacies though some consumers utilize mail order service.
Statin prices vary. An average individual’s annual supply of statins costs around
$650 and an average consumer pays approximately one third of their statins cost
out-of-pocket with the remainder paid by the insurer.16
As noted earlier statins are considered relatively safe medications. Side effects are
rare (on the order of 5/10,000) and discontinuation of treatment is only recommended
if side effects are unmanageable. Further there is heterogeneity in the likelihood of
experiencing a side effect by statin, by age and by gender. For each statin I compute
the side effect incidence rates by gender and by age categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39,
14Additional purchases of the same drug are added to day supply, but if an individual switches to
a new drug before running out of the old drug then the old drug is thrown away. However only 7.6
percent of enrollees used more then one statin in any given year and dropping these observations
from analysis does not change model estimates.
15Final year adherence is top coded at 100 percent and excess day supply carries over to the next
year otherwise
16Included in the analysis as statins are Simvastatin (Zocor), Atorvastatin Calcium (Lipitor),
Rosuvastatin Calcium (Crestor), Pravastatin Sodium (Pravachol), Lovastatin (Mevacor, Altoprev),
Fluvastatin Sodium (Lescol) and Pitavastatin Calcium (Livalo), Niacin, also know as vitamin B3,
blended with Simivastin, Niacin blended with Lovastatin and Ezetimibe blended with Simvastatin.
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40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 .17 Note that this is a measure of side effect
prevalence but not of side effect intensity. That is to say estimated side effect rates
represent the likelihood of experiencing at least one side effect regardless of severity.
Statin users are not a random sample from MarketScan. Probit estimates indi-
cated that statin users tended to be older, sicker and more likely to be male then
typical enrollees.18
2.3 Empirical Analysis
To explore the effects of adherence on medical costs I specify linear models of the
form:
yit+1 = αAdherenceit +Xitβ + γpt + lt + τt + dgiai (2.1)
Where, depending on the model, yit+1 represents log of total medical costs or log of
enrollee total out-of-pocket cost. Adherence is scaled so that one unit of adherence
represents 1 percent of an annual supply. Enrollee year covariates, Xit, include risk
score, policyholder indicator and age group dummies, gender, and age group gender
interactions. Risk scores, age and gender are important cost and morbidity predictors.
Policyholders make both insurance and consumption choices, thus policyholder status,
combined with plan type, capture contract effects. Fixed effects include plan-type-
year, γpt, three digit zip codes, lt, and calendar year, τt, to account for geographic and
time varying differences in outcomes. Experiencing a health or cost shock is likely
to effect current adherence. To avoid the feedback loop all models regress current
adherence and covariates on outcomes one year later. Errors are clustered at the
1719-24 year olds are grouped with the 25-29 year olds as there are very few statin users younger
than 26 in the sample
18I estimate conditional likelihood of being a statin user using the set of individuals continuously
enrolled from 2007 though 2012 for whom I was able to obtain 2007 demographic information. The
resulting MarketScan extract contains 5,061,093 people. Propensity score’s are derived from estimat-
ing P (statin user|X2007) = κ1+κ2age group2007+κ3male+κ4risk score2007+κ5policy holder2007+
κ6zip2007 + e.
59
drug age-group gender.19
Directly estimating the equation above is likely to lead to biased estimates of α
as unobservable variables such as physical activity and diet must be captured in dgiai
inducing correlation between Adherenceit and dgiai . To estimate the causal effect of
adherence on medical costs, I employ an instrumental variable approach exploiting
variation in side effect rates by statin within demographically similar people. Specif-
ically I construct an instrument based on liver damage prevalence, the most common
adverse side effect of statins.
2.3.1 The Instrument
A valid instrument for adherence must be correlated with adherence, but, other than
through the conduit of adherence, have no direct effect on the outcomes. With this
in mind, consider features specific to statins. Like many medications statins are not
without side effects and the most common side effect of stains is liver damage. The
likelihood of liver damage depends on demographics and pharmaceutical interactions.
I exploit heterogeneity in side effect rates to construct an instrument correlated with
adherence but with no direct effect on medical costs. I use, conditional on demo-
graphics, drug specific liver side effect rates as an instrument for adherence. Formally
zit =
∑
d∈D
Pit(d) ∗ Pˆ (liver|d, gi, ai) (2.2)
Where I estimate the likelihood of liver damage, P (liver|d, gi, ai), separately for each
drug at 5-year interval age bands20 for men and women. Similarly I compute Pit(d)
as drug d’s proportion of individual i’s annual use in year t.21
19Enrollees who used more than one drug are clustered to the drug they used most frequently
within the year.
20Alternate age categorizations result in cells that are too sparse or too few units over which the
instrument varies to identify effects.
21For example an individual who purchases 90 days worth of Simvastatin and 30 days of Atorvas-
tatin in 2007 has Pi2007(Simvastatin) =
3
4 and Pi2007(Atorvastatin) =
1
4 .
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2.3.2 Identification
It is important to note that this instrument is not a measure of an individual’s side ef-
fect history. Those who have experienced liver damage may for unobservable reasons
have higher medical costs. The identifying variation comes from differences in side
effect rates by statin among demographically similar individuals. Higher likelihood of
liver damage induces lower adherence among demographically similar individuals.22
Notice that this relationship is strong despite the fact that liver side effects are in-
credibly rare. This instrument is a measure of relative discomfort associated with
a statin for similar users and the strength of the relationship between this measure
and adherence suggests that the side effect rates sufficiently proxy for the relative
discomfort associated with different statins for different groups of people. One im-
portant caveat to interpreting the results is that if physicians are incorporating the
poor adherence driven by side effects into the beneficiaries choice of what statin to use
then instrument will not be valid. As I cannot reject the hypothesis that the choice
of statin is correlated with observable demographics, this caveat is a concern and
the results should thus be interpreted appropriately. Liver side effect rates influence
expenditures directly through the cost of treatment for the side effects and indirectly
through their role in adherence. All expenditure measures excluded costs potentially
related to liver side effects to ensure liver side effect rates are a valid instrument.
Specifically any claim occurring on a day where there is a medical claim containing
a diagnosis consistent with liver damage is thrown out. This method may miss some
liver related expenditure. If liver expenditures are not sufficiently expunged then
estimates of alpha may be biased. Since using a medication with higher likelihood
of experiencing liver side effects can lead to more side effect expenditures and higher
side effect rates lower adherence the inclusion of liver related expenditures could bias
22Indeed all models pass weak instrument test. See the IV first stage: Table 2.3.
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away from finding cost savings. As a result, the estimated cost savings may be smaller
than the true cost savings if liver expenditures are not completely removed from the
cost measures. Absent liver related expenditures liver side effects rates only influence
expenditure through the effect of adherence. While theoretically important, liver re-
lated expenditures in the sample analyzed are small and estimates are not affected
by the inclusion or exclusion of liver related expenditures.
2.3.3 Results
To investigate the effect of statin adherence on individual total annual medical costs
I estimate equation (2.3) with log of in the following years’ total medical costs as
the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 2.4. Column 1 displays the
coefficients from estimating equation (2.3) via OLS. Notice how the coefficient on
adherence is near zero, significant and positive. Absent accounting for correlation
between adherence and the error estimation of the effect of adherence on cost the
following year results in bias sufficient to mask cost savings. Similar to (Hepke et al.,
2004) and (Lillard et al., 1999) OLS estimates do not reveal cost savings despite
measurable reductions in adverse events. Column 2 presents reduced form estimates.
Column 4 displays the main estimates instrumenting for Adherenceit with side
effect rates, zit. The coefficient on adherence is both negative and significant. I
estimate an .11 percent reduction in next year total cost induced by an additional 1
percent adherence. This translates into approximately 1 percent reduction in total
medical expenditure from an additional 30 day refill of statin.23 This point estimate is
stable with little change excluding location, plan-year and year fixed effects (Column
3). Indeed estimates indicate statins are an investment and poor adherence to statin
medication is costly.
Next I explore the effect of statin adherence on individual total annual out-of-
231 percent adherence = 3.65 day supply.
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pocket estimating (2.3) with log of next year’s total out-of-pocket costs as the depen-
dent variable. I present results in Table 2.5. OLS estimates (Column 1), much like
total expenditures, find that the coefficient on adherence is near zero, positive and
significant. Column 2 presents reduced form estimates.
Column 4 displays the main estimates instrumenting for Adherenceit with side
effect rates, zit. Again the coefficient on adherence is both negative and significant.
Estimates imply a near identical percent reduction in out-of-pocket as found with
total costs. Similar to the effect on total costs an additional 30-day refill of statins
induces a 1 percent reduction in out-of-pocket expenditures the following year. This
point estimate is also stable with little change excluding location, plan-year and year
fixed effects (Column 3). Estimates indicate savings are felt not only by the insurers
but also by the individual.
Statin expenditures mechanically rise with adherence: as you buy more statins
your total expenditures raise by the cost of those statins. This mechanical effect is
uninteresting, and thus, all models exclude statin costs. Looking at average statin
prices, model estimates and average out-of-pocket costs one might draw false conclu-
sions. Specifically the average out-of-pocket price for a 30 days supply in sample is
$12.69. Given model estimates for a 30 day supply an individual saves only $10.6024 in
out-of-pocket costs the following year. Correspondingly including statin expenditures
in expenditure measures should result is less cost saving among the more adherent,
however, including statin costs in expenditure measures results in the opposite effect
(see Table 2.8). Surprisingly cost savings from adherence are larger when including
statin costs in expenditure than when not including statin costs. This phenomenon
can only occur if the more adherent enrollees consume statin that are substantially
cheaper than the less adherent. Indeed there is a negative correlation between the
241 percent of average out-of-pocket costs in sample.
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full compliance out-of-pocket price and adherence.25 This observation indicates price
sensitivity is likely an important determinant of adherence and that despite the av-
erage statin out-of-pocket price for a 30 day supply exceeding 1 percent of average
out-of-pocket costs enrollees save by adhering to statins. It is also worth noting that
there is a near zero correlation between risk score and adherence in the sample ana-
lyzed indicating that among the individuals analyzed statin adherence was not driven
by underlying health status.26
2.3.4 Simulation Exercise
To examine the potential implications of price sensitivity on total costs, using model
estimates and price sensitivity estimates from the literature, I simulate the change in
total costs that could result from a reduction in cost share. Specifically
∂ ln(Exp)
∂poopstatin
=
∂ ln(Exp)
∂adher
∗ ∂adher
∂poopstatin
Chandra, Gruber and McKnight summarize the literature on reduced form price
elasticity estimates for pharmaceuticals and they report elasticities ranging from -.1
to -.4.27 Suppose an individual has price sensitivity of -.1, her statin costs $650 and
she faces out-of-pocket price of $155 for a year supply. Suppose that at this price
she is adherent 80 percent of the time and has total medical costs $8,100.28 Notice
that she pays 24 percent of her statin costs. Now suppose that the insurer decides to
lower the out-of-pocket price by 1 percent or $1.55. This $1.55 decrease induces a 1
percent increase in adherence resulting in a 0.112 percent decrease in total medical
25The full compliance out-of-pocket price is defined as the price a consumer would have paid for
full compliance assuming they continued to face the same prices p = OOPstatinadherence .
26A potential threat to identification that has been raised is the presence of unobservable pre-
scription practices. A priori we have no reason to believe that practices deviate from guidelines.
27For comparison (Finkelstein et al., 2015) estimate drug price elasticity to be between -.3 and -.5
among Medicare beneficiaries while (Karaca-Mandic et al., 2013) estimates an elasticity of adherence
for statin drugs of -.95 for Medicare Part D beneficiaries.
28These are the mean values in sample
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cost amounting to $9.07 savings. Notice that the insurer must pay an additional
$1.24 (=.8 ∗ (1.55)) for the statins previously consumed and must pay and additional
$4.97 (=.01 ∗ (650 − 153.45)) for the increased adherence, however the individual’s
total costs fall by $9.07 and this more then compensates for the increased medication
cost. With the insurer paying for 75 percent of medical costs then savings to the
insurer, $6.80, outweigh the added medication cost, $6.21, even taking into account
the increase in statin use.29
2.3.5 Health Benefits
Identification of health benefits relies on an assumption not testable in the data.
Some medical indicators of heart attacks and strokes, such as age and body-mass-
index, are common to liver damage. While body-mass-index in not observable in this
data risk scores capture much of the variation underlying health and it is reasonable
to believe that liver side effect rates do not have a direct effect on heart attack or
stroke incidence among demographically similar individuals conditional on risk score.
To explore health benefits of statins I replace in yit in equation (2.3) with heart
attack incidence and then stroke incidence the following year. Table 2.6 presents
results from estimating the effect of adherence on heart attack incidence per 10,000
enrollees the following year. Correspondingly the coefficient on adherence in Column 4
of Table 2.6 is interpreted as a 15 in 10,000 reduction in the likelihood of a heart attack
in the following year from one percentage point increase in adherence. Compared to
a mean of 130/10,000 this translates into an 11 percent relative reduction in heart
attack likelihood. Comparing the IV to OLS results, Columns 4 and 1 respectively,
we see that while both indicate statin adherence reduces heart attack likelihood the
IV estimates are substantially larger, though less precise.
29This simulation serves as a lower bound on the potential savings: Insurers in this sample on
average pay 88 percent of an enrollees total medical costs, and I calibrate price sensitivity to the
lower bound of estimates in the literature
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Table 2.7 presents results from estimating the effect of adherence on stroke inci-
dence per 10,000 enrollees the following year. I estimate a .7 in 10,000 reduction in
the likelihood of having a stroke in the following year from an additional one percent
adherence, though not statistically significant. Compared to a mean of 21 strokes
per 10,000 these estimates translate into a little over a 3 percent reduction in stroke
likelihood. Similar to the estimates for heart attack incidence comparing the IV to
OLS results, Columns 4 and 1 respectively, shows that both the OLS and IV results
indicate statin adherence reduces the likelihood of having a stroke in the following
year. Here again the IV estimates are larger but less precise.
Similar to previous studies I find measurable health benefits from statin adher-
ence. Health benefit estimates are consistent with poor unobservable health behavior
biasing OLS estimates away from cost savings.
2.3.6 Benefit Heterogeneity
Intuitively one might expect that, among statin users, those for whom the statins
are most needed receive the most benefit from adherence30. To explore benefit het-
erogeneity I partition the sample according to measures of expected need. As actual
cholesterol levels were not available in the data I construct three measures of expected
need. Specifically I partition the sample by age and then by risk score and then by
the expected probability that the enrollee is a statin user. Table 2.10 present model
estimates on the 6 sub samples generated by partitioning the sample according to
each of these measures.
Cholesterol issues are more prevalent among the old. Correspondingly I partition
the sample according to the median age of the statin users in 2007. The “young” sub
sample consists of statin uses who were younger than the median age of statin users in
30Brugts et al. (2009) and Palmer et al. (2012) explore benefit heterogeneity based on need and
common comorbidity intensity respectively
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sample in 2007, 53 years of age, and the “old” sub sample consisted of the remaining
observations. Cost savings from adherence are statistically indistinguishable from
the main model for the young and old sub samples though the reduction in heart
attack likelihood is larger for the older sample. While this partitioning indicates
health benefit heterogeneity it lends no evidence towards heterogeneity in percent
cost reduction.
Anticipating that the sickest individuals, in terms of expected cost, might receive
the most benefit in the second sub sample analyses I partition the sample according
to the median risk score within each age-gender-band in 2007. The “healthy” sub
sample consists of statin users who had a risk score less than the median risk score
of demographically similar individuals in 2007 and correspondingly the “sick” sub
sample consists of the rest. Unsurprisingly the sick sub sample saves significantly
more than the healthy sub sample from statin adherence and these estimates sandwich
the main model estimates. Similarly the sick have a larger reduction in heart attack
likelihood though this distinction is not statistically significant.
These two previous measures are based on an anticipated association between
observables in the data and the statin need. Using the full set of continuously enrolled
individuals with demographic information from MarketScan extract, 5,061,093 people,
I run a probit model to construct the likelihood that, conditional on observables, an
enrollee is a statin user. Age, gender and risk score are predictive of being a statin
user. The third sub sample analysis partitions the sample according to the estimated
propensity scores. The “unlikely” sub sample consists of all observations of statin
users with estimated likelihood below the median propensity score. The “likely” sub
sample consisted of the rest. Consistent with the prior two sub sample analyses on
those who were “likely” to be statin users received more benefit: greater cost savings,
heart attack likelihood reduction and stroke likelihood reduction.
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These sub sample analyses indicate that while there is some benefit heterogeneity
even those with the lowest expected benefit receive substantial benefits from statin
adherence.
2.3.7 Adherence Lowers Cost but the Adherent Cost More?
Even though adherence lowers each consumer’s cost the average cost among the ad-
herers can be higher than among those who do not adhere when there is an unobserved
factor, such as physical activity, that correlates with adherence and affects cost. To
illustrate this consider the following thought experiment. Suppose there is a mass
of enrollees and each enrollee has type ti ∼ U [0, 1] where ti can be interpreted as
i’s level of physical activity and suppose that there is a mental cost associated with
adherence. Specifically suppose each enrollee decides weather or not to be adherent
αi ∈ {0, 1} where αi = 1 implies the consumer is adherent. Further suppose that
an enrollee of type t has medical costs c(α|t) = (4 − 3t − α + αt)2 and a mental
cost v(α|t) = α. Notice that conditional on activity adherence lowers medical costs
and conditional on adherence more active enrollees cost less however the average cost
among the adherent is larger then the average cost among the non-adherent.
2.3.8 Robustness Checks
To assess the robustness of results I re-run models testing sensitivity of estimates
to the chosen specification. I run models with subsets of controls finding model
estimates are fairly robust to the chosen set of controls. Excluding time, location
and plan fixed effects does not significantly alter estimates. As expected age and
risk score are incredibly important but estimates are similar with and without taking
into account the interaction between age and gender, or accounting for policyholder
status.
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To ensure estimates are not driven by a particular subset of enrollees I re-run
models excluding sub sets of observations. All models were run on the sample ex-
cluding the fully adherent and never adherent, adherence = 0 or 1, finding essentially
the same estimates. Diabetics often take regular insulin to manipulate their blood
sugar levels. Given that diabetes is a common condition, especially among those
with cholesterol issues31, one might worry that the effects of statin adherence differ
substantially between diabetics and non-diabetics potentially skewing results. This is
especially worrisome if adherence is correlated across treatments. However, analysis
excluding all enrollees who were ever diagnosed with diabetes from the sample results
in similar IV estimates. Interestingly when excluding diabetics from analysis out-of-
pocket savings are found even absent instrumenting for adherence, indicating that
the omitted poor behavior is likely more prevalent among diabetics. Healthy diet and
regular exercise are recommended for reducing the likelihood of the onset of diabetes
and thus one may expect that poor diet and lack of exercise are more likely among
diabetics. This observation is consistent with poor diet and lack of exercise driving a
wedge between the association and casual effect of statin adherence on health related
outcomes. Utilizing side effects as an instrument requires excluding direct side effect
expenditures. However, this exclusion is innocuous as liver side effect related expen-
ditures are not large in the sample and including these expenditures has no effect on
model estimates.
2.4 Conclusion
This study provides further evidence that adherence to statin medication reduces
future medical costs. I find that the average out-of-pocket for an annual supply
of statins exceeds the estimated reduction of average enrollees total out-of-pocket
31The proportion of statin users with diabetes in sample exceeds the proportion of diabetics
between the 19 and 64 years of age in MarketScan
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from an annual supply of statins. However, including statin expenditures in cost
measures reveals that more adherent enrollees save, even after accounting for statin
expenditures, because more adherent users tend to consume cheaper statins. I find
evidence of price sensitivity suggesting that reducing the cost sharing on statins can
be a profitable investment for insurers. I find that insurers cost saving incentives to
induce statin adherence are stronger then enrollees cost saving incentives. The IV
results indicate that unobserved variables, which may include lack of exercise, and/or
poor dietary choices, cause bias in the OLS estimates.
This study examines statin benefits for a sample of employees and their depen-
dents, most of whom are healthy enough to maintain employment, are not on Medicare
or Medicaid, and do not die over the entire sample period. Because this is a young,
relatively healthy sample it is likely that this study underestimates the potential ben-
efits of statin usage for an older, sicker population. Similarly, benefits are estimated
conditional on statin prescription and at least some statin usage. Ko et al. (2004)
find that many with high cardiovascular risk are not yet prescribed statins. These
estimates do not account for the potential benefits of increasing the prescription of
statins to high cardiovascular risk non-users. Additionally this paper only estimates
in the following years’ savings from statin adherence but statin benefits may occur
contemporaneously and continue to accrue two or three years later. Contract designs
that deter adherence can impose high social costs and thus reimbursement rates and
quality metrics should reflect this. Chernew et al. (2007) recommend value based
insurance design that uses patient characteristics, such as the prevalence of a chronic
condition, to determine benefit coverage, with low cost for treatments with high ex-
pected value conditional on patient characteristics. Frank et al. (2012) examined a
value based insurance program implemented by a large regional health insurer who
lowered statin copayments by 42.5 percent finding non-adherence was reduced by 11
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percent. Future research should further explore the determinants of adherence and
investigate the relationship between diet, exercise and drug compliance. Finally the
cost savings from adherence are found in the future and thus enrollee turnover may
reduce insurer incentives to induce health investment. Assessing the cost and benefits
of statin usage among the elderly is especially important for determining Medicare
Part D policies. The methodology in this paper is useful for other medications. For
example, individuals suffering from diabetes must regularly consume insulin to regu-
late their blood sugar levels. Hypertension also requires regular continual treatment.
Together these findings also point out the importance of health insurance cov-
erage. Health insurers can induce good behavior in enrollees who suffer from bias
though carful contract design. Absent adequate coverage, individuals will underin-
vest in health leading to poor health outcomes and higher future cost. However,
just as insurers can induce good behavior they are not always incentivized to do so,
Grubb (2012) shows how firms can capitalize on enrollee bias via dynamic nonlinear
pricing strategies. In particular, given sizable drug offsets, integrating medical and
pharmaceutical coverage is essential for incentivizing health investment since other-
wise the the cost reducing benefits of generous drug coverage are not passed on to the
pharmaceutical insurer. Alternatively a policy that transfers non-pharmaceutical in-
surers drug offset savings to pharmaceutical insurers, similar to how risk adjustment
corrects for adverse selection, could be a welfare enhancing.
Future research should seek to understand the extent to which enrollees and in-
surers are aware of the cost savings induced by statin adherence and how this affects
health plan choices and even health plan offerings by insurers. Generous coverage for
statins may attract sicker people into a health plan, which may be unprofitable. This
is further exacerbated if health plans do not hold onto enrollees long enough to ben-
efit from investing in enrollee health or are only responsible for the pharmaceutical
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portion of health care costs.
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Claims
Adherence
30 day
Jan 6th
30 day
Feb 10th
30 day
Feb 20th
2 hospitalized days
March 26th
30 day
April 20th
30 days
5 days without
62 days
7 days without
30 days
Adherence =
days
days+days without
Points on the claim time line represent statin purchases or hospitalizations. Intervals on the adherence line represent
chunks of time where the enrollee does (days) or does not (days without) have medication.
Figure 2·1: Example Adherence
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Figure 2·2: Percent Adherence Among Users
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Figure 2·3: Age Distribution of Statin Users in 2007
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
VARIABLES Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max
Adherence 84 21 0 93 100
Age 53 6.7 21 54 64
Male 0.56 0.50 0 1 1
DxCG Concurrent Risk Score 1.97 3.11 0.03 1.11 87.1
Policyholder 0.7 0.46 0 1 1
Heart Attack 0.017 0.13 0 0 1
Stroke 0.003 0.055 0 0 1
Liver Side Effect 0.000084 0.0092 0 0 1
Expenditure Net Statins 7,767 20,474 0 3,357 1.045∗
Statins Expenditure 538 507 0 327 7,464
Out-of-pocket Net Statins 937 1,322 0 619 630,329
Statins Out-of-pocket 125 135 0 75 2,572
Notes: ∗: Expenditure Net Statins maximum is in millions of dollars.
Table 2.2: Plan Composition
Plan Type Share
Comprehensive 3.5 percent
Exclusive provider organization 0.7 percent
Health maintenance organization 27 percent
Point of service 9 percent
Preferred provider organization 52 percent
Preferred provider organization with capitation 0.2 percent
Consumer directed health plan 6.1 percent
High deductible health plan 1.1 percent
Years 2007-2012: People 400,062: Sample Size 1,530,631
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Table 2.3: First Stage
Outcome:
Adherence OLS
Side Effect Rate -0.046∗∗∗
(0.012)
Obs 1,178,422
Mean of Dep Var 83.7
FIV 15.1
R2 0.039
Notes: model includes a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if male), an
indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age categories 19-29,
30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions between gender and age
group, 3-digit zip code, year and plan-type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a
one unit increase represents an additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such
that a 1 unit increase in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence
per 10,000 users. Robust standard errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in
parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Table 2.4: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Medical Costs Excluding
Statins
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total Expenditure Net Statins)t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence 0.0021∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.00014) (0.019) (0.024)
Side Effect Rate 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0010)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,128,170 1,128,170 1,128,170 1,128,170
Mean of Dep Var 8.12 8.12 8.12 8.12
FIV 14.5 11.0
R2 0.16 0.16
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if male),
an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age categories
19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions between gender
and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and plan-type-year fixed
effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents an additional 1 percent
annual supply. side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase in side effect rates represents
an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users. Robust standard errors clustered
at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.5: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Out-Of-Pocket Excluding
Statins
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(OOP Net Statins)t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence 0.0015∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.000093) (0.039) (0.024)
Side Effect Rate 0.0043∗∗∗
(0.00100)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,121,884 1,121,884 1,121,884 1,121,884
Mean of Dep Var 6.33 6.33 6.33 6.33
FIV 14.3 10.8
R2 0.25 0.25
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if
male), an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age
categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions
between gender and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and plan-
type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents an
additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase
in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users.
Robust standard errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.6: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Heart Attack Incidence
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Heart Attack}t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence -1.04∗∗∗ -12.4∗∗ -15.1∗
(0.091) (4.67) (6.15)
Side Effect Rate 0.59∗
(0.29)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983
Mean of Dep Var 131.3 131.3 131.3 131.3
FIV 14.5 10.9
R2 0.019 0.019
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if
male), an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age
categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions
between gender and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and
plan-type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents
an additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase
in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users.
Heart attack incidence is scaled so that coefficients represent the effect of a change in a right
hand side variable on the likelihood of experiencing a heart attack per 10,000 users. Robust
standard errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.7: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Stroke Incidence
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Stroke}t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence -0.28∗∗∗ -0.86 -0.72
(0.033) (1.06) (1.48)
Side Effect Rate 0.028
(0.058)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983
Mean of Dep Var 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3
FIV 14.5 10.9
R2 0.0030 0.0029
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if
male), an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age
categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions
between gender and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and
plan-type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents
an additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase
in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users.
Stroke incidence is scaled so that coefficients represent the effect of a change in a right hand
side variable on the likelihood of experiencing a stroke per 10,000 users. Robust standard
errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.8: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Medical Costs Including
Statins
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Total Expenditure)t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence 0.0031∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.00024) (0.037) (0.045)
Side Effect Rate 0.0049∗
(0.0022)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983 1,129,983
Mean of Dep Var 8.33 8.33 8.33 8.33
FIV 14.5 10.9
R2 0.17 0.17
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if
male), an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age
categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions
between gender and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and
plan-type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents
an additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase
in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users.
Robust standard errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.9: Effect of Adherence on the Following Years’ Out-Of-Pocket Includ-
ing Statins
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(OOP)t+1 OLS RF IV IV
Adherence 0.0023∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.00016) (0.046) (0.039)
Side Effect Rate 0.0048∗
(0.0019)
FE: Zip code, Year, Plan-type-year Yes Yes No Yes
Obs 1,127,660 1,127,660 1,127,660 1,127,660
Mean of Dep Var 6.56 6.56 6.56 6.56
FIV 14.4 10.9
R2 0.28 0.28 . .
Notes: All models include a constant, concurrent risk scores, an indicator for gender (1 if
male), an indicator for policy holder status (1 if policy holder), age group dummies for age
categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions
between gender and age group. Models 1,2 and 4 also include 3-digit zip code, year and
plan-type-year fixed effects. Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents
an additional 1 percent annual supply. Side effect rates are scaled such that a 1 unit increase
in side effect rates represents an additional liver related side effect incidence per 10,000 users.
Robust standard errors clustered at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
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Table 2.10: Benefit Heterogeneity: Adherence Effects by Subsample
Outcome: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Cost Net Statins)t+1 Full Old Young Sick Healthy Likely Unlikely
Adherence -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.032) (0.039) (0.017) (0.033) (0.026)
Obs 1,128,170 505,044 623,126 556,132 572,038 542,035 586,135
Mean of Dep Var 8.1 8.3 8.0 8.6 7.7 8.3 8.0
Outcome:
log(OOP Net Statin)t+1 Full Old Young Sick Healthy Likely Unlikely
Adherence -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.030) (0.038) (0.017) (0.033) (0.025)
Obs 1,121,884 502,838 619,046 554,600 567,284 539,672 582,212
Mean of Dep Var 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.7 6.0 6.5 6.2
Outcome:
1{Heart Attack}t+1 Full Old Young Sick Healthy Likely Unlikely
Adherence -15∗ -23∗ -8.4 -27 -7.6∗ -30∗ -0.52
(6.2) (10.6) (6.7) (14) (3.6) (12) (4.7)
Obs 1,129,983 505,499 624,484 556,416 573,567 542,579 587,404
Mean of Dep Var 131.3 169.8 100.1 202.5 62.20 198.1 69.6
Outcome:
1{Stroke}t+1 Full Old Young Sick Healthy Likely Unlikely
Adherence -0.72 -1.6 0.039 -1.3 -0.43 0.74 -1.7
(1.5) (2.3) (2.2) (2.8) (1.2) (2.3) (2.1)
Obs 1,121,884 502,838 619,046 554,600 567,284 539,672 582,212
Mean of Dep Var 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.7 6.0 6.5 6.2
Notes: Column 1 shows the main estimates. Columns 2 and 3 show results for the
subsamples of individuals older than and younger than 53 in 2007 respectively. Column
4 and 5 show results for the subsets of enrollees with above/bellow sample median risk
score among each age-group-gender partition respectively. Column 6 and 7 show results
for the subset of enrollees with above/bellow median likelihood of being a statin user
respectively. Likelihood is estimated using propensity scores calculated from the full
continuously enrolled Marketscan sample, 5,061,093 people, as predicted by risk scores,
gender age and policy holder status. All models include a constant, concurrent risk
scores, an indicator for gender (1 if male), an indicator for policy holder status (1
if policy holder), age group dummies for age categories 19-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44,
45-49, 50-54, 55-59 and 60-64 as well as interactions between gender and age group.
Adherence is scaled by 100 so that a one unit increase represents an additional 1
percent annual supply. Stroke and heart attack incidence are scaled so that coefficients
represent the effect of a change in a right hand side variable on the likelihood of
experiencing a stroke/heart attack per 10,000 users. Robust standard errors clustered
at drug-agegroup-gender level are in parenthesis.
* p <0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p <0.001
Chapter 3
Plan Choice, Star Ratings and Switching
Behavior in Privatized Medicare
The presence of consumer inertia in health insurance choice is well documented in
health care markets.1 However few studies have have identify the magnitude of switch-
ing costs. Part of the issue with identifying switching costs is a lack of plausible exoge-
nous variation in the incentives or barriers to switching health insurance plans. This
paper exploits the “5-star Special Enrollment Period” Medicare reform implemented
in 2012 that reduced barriers to switching in a subset of privatized medicare health
insurance markets. Specifically the policy allowed medicare beneficiaries to switch
health insurance plans outside of the usual open enrollment period if the beneficiary
switched to a 5-star rated plan. However not all markets had a 5 star plan in 2012
and thus similar markets where the highest rated plans had a 4 or 4.5 star rating
were unaffected by the policy. This paper explores the impact of reduced barriers to
switching on the switching behavior and the corresponding impact of the policy on
the 5-star rated plan’s enrollee composition, specifically the change in their risk pool.
The lack of switching documented in health insurance markets need not be driven
by inertia. Enrollees may stay in a plan simply because the plan is their favorite. How-
ever Abaluck and Gruber (2016) document substantial cost savings were beneficiaries
to be enrolled in their cheapest plan, even accounting for reasonable uncertainty in
health shocks, and that even when switching beneficiaries often do not choose the
1This chapter is derived from joint work with Francesco Decarolis and Andrea Guglielmo.
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cheapest plan according to their expected health care utilization. By contrast Han-
del and Kolstad (2103) illustrates that information frictions are responsible for much
of consumer inertia and that, over time, beneficiaries may become better at making
health insurance choices suggesting that there is perhaps a learning component to
health insurance choice. These results taken together suggest that a policy stimulat-
ing health insurance choice could lead to beneficiaries making better choices. However
health insurance markets have open enrollment periods for good reason. Were bene-
ficiaries, for example, to switch to more generous plans every time they experienced a
health shock, and when healthy switch to plans with low generosity then the risk pool-
ing component of health insurance could break down and the market could unravel,
as shown by Handel (2013).
The “5-star Special Enrollment Period” Medicare reform was introduced with the
goal of increasing the enrollment in 5-star rated plans. However there was also a
concern that the policy could result in adverse selection in that the 5-star plans could
end up attracting high risk enrollees who make use of the SEP to move to 5-star plans
in response to a worsening of health or an adverse health shock. Alternatively there
was concern that the policy may not have bite, if the lack of plan switching was not
due to inertia, or if the policy did not sufficiently reduce the switching cost then there
could have been no effect of the policy at all. In this paper we speak to both these
concerns.
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. First estimate the within year
change in 5-star plan enrollment to document weather or not the policy had an
impact. Second we look between year enrollment changes for evidence of potential
market unraveling strategic switching behavior, specifically beneficiaries selecting low
premium low generosity plans during open enrollment and then switching to 5-star
plans only after experiencing a health shock. Finally we look at changes in insurer
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risk pools between years to assess the impact of the policy on risk selection.
The most straightforward effect that we seek to uncover is whether consumers
move to 5-star plans during the year once the policy went into effect. We use Center
for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) data on monthly enrollment at the contract level
to assess whether 5-star plans experience a change in their within-year enrollment
(measured as the difference between the enrollment in December and in January of
the same year) relative to comparable plans. For our baseline difference-in-difference
models, the comparison plans are the 4 and 4.5 star plans offered in markets where
no 5-star plans are offered. As explained below, this choice of control plans, aside
from ensuring that both treatment and control plans are the top star-rated plans in
their markets, also serves to limit the bias in identification that could result from a
simultaneous reform of plan payments. Our main finding is that, for Part C plans,
the 5-star SEP is associated with a positive and significant increase in the within-year
change in enrollment ranging from 7 percent to 16 percent of the contract enrollment
base.
We then look at enrollment changes across the years. While the previous results
show that consumers respond to the most direct effect of the policy, a more sophis-
ticated response would entail exiting 5-star plans during the open enrollment period
and rejoining them during the year when hit by a health shock. Such behavior could
lead to market unravel as show in Handel et al. (2015). The data, however, does not
provide evidence in support of this behavior.
Finally, the last element of our analysis looks at changes in plans risk pool across
years. For both Part C and D risk score measures, we find clear evidence that the
5-star plans risk pool did not worsen in response to the policy. Under most model
specifications, we estimate a positive, albeit small improvement in 5-star plans risk
pools. Hence our analysis indicates that the 5-star SEP successfully achieved the goal
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of fostering 5-star plan enrollment, without worsening selection concerns.
3.1 Literature
Within the broad literature that has looked at plan demand, our emphasis on plan
switching is shared by a few recent studies, like Ketcham et al. (2012), Ketcham et al.
(2014), Ho et al. (2014), for Part D and Nosal (2012) and Miller (2014) for Part C.
Another closely related, albeit different, study is Madeira (2015) which exploits the 5-
star SEP in the Part D market to study plan switching with regard to the presence of
behavioral biases in enrollee choices.2 Finally, the relevance of the star rating system
for plan choices has already been stressed by Abaluck and Gruber (2015), for Part D,
and Reid et al. (2013) and Darden and McCarthy (2014), for Part C.3
3.2 Institutions: Rating System and Policy Changes
The Medicare Part C and D programs share several organizational features. Both
programs consist of private insurers offering a menu of plans to Medicare beneficiaries.
Plan design, features and availability are constrained by regulations mostly by the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). However the two programs differ
along many dimensions, most notably over what services they cover and who is eligible
for coverage. Medicare Part C is a privately provided alternative to Traditional
Medicare (TM). As such, Part C plans must cover Medicare Part A and Part B
2A limitation of our analysis relative to the most recent literature is that it is based on plan level
data instead of individual claims data. This prevents us, for instance, from studying how the 5-star
SEP interacts with moral hazard, for instance by influencing the dynamics of how enrollees use their
plans to purchase drugs during the year. Given the presence of such dynamic effects, documented
by Aron-Dine et al. (2015), we would ideally like to extend our analysis to individual level data and
we currently have a pending request to the CMS for the utilization of such data.
3In this respect, our paper is also related to a vast literature in health care that looks at whether
public disclosure of quality measures has been effective in better matching patients with products
and providers. See, for instance works on the impact of report cards on insurance plans (Dafny and
Dranove (2008), Jin and Sorensen (2006)), fertility clinics (Bundorf et al. (2009)), hospitals (Cutler
et al. (2004)) and individual physicians (Wang et al. (2011)).
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benefits (except hospice care), but can offer additional benefits.4 By comparison Part
D is a prescription drug insurance program with voluntary enrollment primarily for
the elderly and disabled.5 The two programs are interlinked, specifically nearly all
Part C Medicare Advantage (MA) plans also include Part D benefits.6 However,
enrollees of TM can obtain Part D benefits by enrolling in stand alone Part D plans
know as Prescription Drug Plans (PDP) and thus need not also be enrolled in Part
C. This section describes three key regulatory aspects: the plan rating systems and
the two reforms linking ratings with enrollment periods and subsidies, respectively.7
A. Rating Systems for Part C and D
CMS rates plans on a 1 to 5 scale to help beneficiaries select plans and to monitor
the market. Ratings are such that a plan with 5-stars is among the highest quality
plans while a plan with 1-star is among the lowest rated plans. More precisely, CMS
assigns ratings aggregated at the contract level and so every plan covered under the
same contract receives the same rating.8 CMS has been collecting information about
plan performance since 1999, but the introduction of the star rating system started
began in 2006 for Part D and in 2007 to Part C.
The rating systems details are fairly complex and have changed over time. Specif-
ically different data sources such as enrollees surveys, administrative data from CMS,
4For reference Medicare Part A includes inpatient hospital, skilled nursing, and some home health
services while Medicare Part B includes physicians’ services, outpatient care, and durable medical
equipment.
5A consumer becomes eligible for Medicare Part D once they turn 65 or if they have one of the
covered disabilities.
6The subset of plans offering both Pat C and D coverage are usually indicated as MA-PD plans.
With a slight abuse of notation we will refer to all Part C plans as MA plans.
7See Newhouse and McGuire (2014) and Duggan et al. (2008b) for recent studies that discuss
more broadly the institutional aspects of Part C and Part D respectively.
8For reference a contract, in Part C, is a particular product type (HMO, PPO or Private FFS)
covering a specific service area (i.e county or group of counties). A Part C plan is finer specification
of benefit package that include type of coverage, premium, copayment, etc within a contract. A Part
D contract, by comparison, typically indicates a drug formulary shared by all plan within a contract
with each plan having different cost share structure (for instance copays) to the same formulary.
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data from plans and other CMS contractors are used to collect information on a broad
set of indicators that together determine a plans rating. The process through which
CMS calculates the star rating involves several steps, first creating individual quality
measure and then aggregating them with “importance” weights. At the most disag-
gregated level there is a large number of “individual measures,” which are aggregated
into a smaller number of “domain measures” and finally into the “summary rating”
through a complex weighting system.9 Table 3.1 reports the domain measures: for
Part C, they cover features such as clinical quality, patient experience, and contractor
performance; for Part D, they cover aspects such as call center hold time, members’
ability to get prescriptions filled easily when using the drug plan, and plan fairness
in denials to members’ appeals.10 Finally the overall rating is expressed in a 5-Star
scale, with increments of half a star, and is released every year in October on the
CMS Plan Finder web site.
A notable feature of the rating system, relevant to our identification strategy, is
that it is hard to manipulate for insurers, especially in the short run. There are at
least three reasons for the lack of manipulability: the first is that CMS changes the
system from year to year. They change both which parameters are evaluated and the
weights that determine how they are aggregated into the overall rating. This aspect
is particularly salient given the large number of different measures that are evaluated,
as shown in Table 3.1. The second is that ratings on individual measures are based
on relative performance of each contract to the entire population of contracts. This
“relative” measure implies that manipulations would require detailed information on
all competing contracts. The third and most crucial reason is that the rating is based
9More precisely, for PDP and MA plans not offering Part D, the summary rating is also the
overall rating. For MA plans, the Part C and D summary ratings are combined to obtain an overall
rating. A more complete description of the process through which CMS calculates the star rating is
detailed in the web appendix.
10this table is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016).
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on lagged data: specifically year t ratings (released on October of year t−1) use data
for the period between January of year t− 2 and June of year t− 1. Thus, to ensure
our results are not affected by rating manipulations, we will focus exclusively on the
first two years after the enrollment reform, before ratings can be adjusted by insurers
potential manipulation strategies.
It is important to note that 5-star contracts are sparse. In 2012 and 2013, for
instance, there only existed two firms that offered 5-star PDP .By comparison seven
firms offer 5 star plans in Part C, as shown in Table 3.2.11 As to the geographical
distribution of plans only 2 regions (region 3, New York, and region 25, formed by 7
midwest states), out of the 34 regions into which Part D divides the United States, had
a 5-star PDP contracts in 2012. As such 5-star plans are substantially more frequent
among MA. However, PDP plans must be offered to all counties within a region while
Part C plans can be offered at the county level. The variation in MA plan presence
by county provide implies greater heterogeneity in access then one would infer from
comparing access at the contract level. Figure 3·2 presents a heat map which shows
the offerings of MA plans across the US. Note that in 2012, 5-star plans are offered
in 156 counties belonging to 17 different states. They span almost the most of the
U.S. geographical areas, with the relevant exception of the central-south area. This
geographical dispersion of 5-star MA plans plays a fundamental role in our empirical
strategy and thus we return to it in the next section.
B. Demand Side Reform: Plan Rating and Enrollment Periods
Beneficiaries generally enroll in a plan during the Open Enrollment Period (OEP)
which spans from October to December of the the year before the coverage period
and must keep the same plan for the entire coverage year. Exceptions to the OEP,
known as Special Enrollment Periods (SEPs), permit enrollees to change plans, but
11This table is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016).
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are typically confined to special circumstances.12
CMS introduced a new type of SEP linked to the star rating system starting
with the 2012 coverage period. This reform allowed all beneficiaries to enroll in a
5-star Part C or D plan outside of open enrollment .13 This SEP rule does have
its restrictions, it can only be used once per year. However it is available even to
enrollees already in a 5-star plan, but who want to switch to another 5-star plan.
Coverage with the new 5-star plan takes effect the first day of the month following
the enrollment. Similar to any other enrollment request, 5-star plans must accept all
applicants. The SEP is not available to enroll in a plan that does not have an overall
5-star rating, even if the plan receives 5-stars in some rating categories, or to change
to a plan offered by the same parent organization as they plan they are currently
on.14 To promote this policy CMS has extensively advertised this new SEP rule in its
communications to consumers. Insurers were publicly informed of the introduction
of the 5-star SEP on November 2010, well in advance of implementation but too late
to engage in manipulation. Specifically since the next round of plan bids was in June
2011 for the menu of plans to be offered in 2012, we consider 2012 as the first year
from which we shall expect to see reactions to the policy change.
C. Supply Side Reform: Plan Rating and Insurers’ Payments
This supply side reform exclusively affected Part C and, like the enrollment reform,
became effective in 2012. Essentially, the reform wanted to reduce overall plan trans-
fers, but also to make transfers relatively more generous for higher quality plans than
12The most relevant SEPs are: (a) for change of residency, including moving to a nursing home;
(b) a drop in, or low, income people (dual eligible or qualifying for the LIS or for SPAPs); (c)
turning 65, people who enroll in a MA plan when they first turn age 65 get a “trial period” (up
to 12 months) to try out MA after which they can unenroll from their first MA plan to go to TM.
Similarly a person can enrol in a Part D plan as soon as they turn 65.
13See the 2012 Newsletter at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/
PrescriptionDrugCovContra/downloads/Announcement2012final2.pdf.
14There is also a special provision for which, if the enrollee uses the 5-Star SEP to enroll in either
a 5-star Private FFS plan or a 5-star Cost Plan, then he gets a “coordinating Part D SEP” allowing
him to enroll in a stand-alone PDP, or in the Cost Plan’s Part D optional benefit, if applicable.
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for lower quality plans. For the purposes of our study, this reform implies that after
2012 per enrollee payments of 5-star plans are more comparable to those of 4 and 4.5
then to those of plans with lower ratings. In essence this is due to how this reform
affects two features of the payment system.
3.3 Theoretical Example
This section presents a simple example to discuss the incentives created by the reform.
Through it we show how, even when consumers have an heterogeneous taste for
insurance, adverse selection emerges when within-year plan switches are allowed.15
Consider a market with two firms, A and B, each offering one insurance plan and an
outside option, Traditional Medicare (TM). For all consumers, let µ be the value of
private insurance (A or B) relative to TM.16 At the time of choosing, each consumer
i knows that he will be either sick, hi = 1, or healthy, hi = 0, and that, for all i,
hi ∼ Bernoulli(γ). Assume A is preferable to B for sick enrollees and, in particular,
let b be a vertical (i.e., commonly agreed) measure of the quality of plan A for sick
enrollees. Consumers are heterogeneous in how they value the benefit of insurance:
let αi ∼ U [0, 1] be such valuation and let it be known to consumers. Firms can only
set their plan premium, cannot deny a consumer to enroll, and, for each enrolled
consumer, face a cost of zero if the consumer is healthy and c if he is sick.
We consider two scenarios and illustrate the associated equilibria through Figure
3·1 (see the web appendix for an algebraic characterization). In the first scenario,
15The objective of the example in this section is not that of providing a comprehensive model that
we will then test through the data, but only to formulate a (very simplistic) framework through
which interpreting our findings. Indeed, as it is well know, modeling insurers with market power
in selection markets where the benefit design is endogenous is an open theoretical problem and
“we currently lack clear characterizations of the equilibrium in a market in which firms compete
over contract dimensions as well as price, and in which consumers may have multiple dimensions of
private information” Einav and Finkelstein (2011).
16A µ < 0 captures the negative utility from the restricted network characterizing private insur-
ance.
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consumers must choose between A, B or TM before learning their health status and
plan switches are not allowed afterwards. Assume that the expected utility for con-
sumer i before observing hi is: ui = −hi if in TM, ui = µ − pB + αi if in B, and
ui = µ−pA+hi(αi+b)+αi if in A.17 The outside option, TM, is thus most appealing
to those with low α and, as α increases, so does the value of A relative to B. The
top panel of Figure 3·1 shows that there are two indifference points: one separating
consumers that choose B from those choosing TM (αB>TM) and the other separating
consumers that choose A from those that choose B (αA>B). These cutoff points define
the plans demand and their exact location is an equilibrium outcome.
The second scenario that we consider entails the possibility of plan switching. To
illustrate the effects of allowing consumers to switch to the high quality plan without
entering the complexities of a fully dynamic model, consider now the setup above with
the following modification of the timing of choices. Insurers set premiums aware that
consumers in TM or B will be allowed to switch to A after observing the realization
of h. Consumers choose a plan or the outside option aware of their own value, αi,
but unaware of their health status h or that they will be able to switch to A. Then
h is realized and consumers learn they can switch to A by paying a switching cost
φTM→A or φB→A respectively, plus any price differential to pA. Switching occurs and,
finally, market shares and profits are realized.18 Note that in this example there is no
adverse selection, the expected average cost for each plan is γc.
The bottom panel of Figure 3·1 describes the equilibrium in this model. Com-
pared to the case without the policy intervention, the αB>TM and αA>B cutoffs move
due to the different equilibrium premiums. Moreover, two new cutoffs points exist
17The utility of TM is normalized to zero for sick enrollees and that of B is set to full insurance.
Many alternative formulations leaving the plan ordering unchanged result in qualitatively similar
results.
18This model is likely more adequate to capture the initial response in the market after the
introduction of the 5-star SEP, than to characterize its medium run impacts on consumer and
insurer behavior.
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determining which enrollees of TM and B will switch to A. The location of these
two new cutoffs points, αTM→A and αB→A, shows that among the enrollees of TM
(or B) it is the subset with the highest values of α that will potentially move. Since
switching is dominated for healthy enrollees, those switching are the sick ones, so
γ(αB>TM − αTM→A) enrollees from TM switch to A and γ(αA>B − αB→A) enrollees
from B switch to A. Note that, since enrollees only switch when sick, the average
costs are not equalized across plans, specifically the marginal cost of plan A becomes
ACA = γ
1− αB→A + αB>TM − αTM→A
1− αA>B + γ(αA>B − αB→A + αB>TM − αTM→A)c > γc
As such the policy induces adverse selection.
This simple framework allows us to illustrate several interesting facts. First, the
policy creates an adverse selection problem since the only beneficiaries that utilize
the mid year switch are those who are sick this in turn implies that the risk pool
of the firm A worsens while the risk pool of firm B and TM improve. Specifically
the average cost without the policy is γc for both A and B, while under the policy
it becomes higher for A and lower for B. Second, switching costs play an important
role. Without them, for most parameter values, all beneficiaries who become sick
will switch to A resulting in complete break down of risk pooling and potentially
market unravel. Fourth unlike the no-mid year switching, by altering b, firm A can
impact selection. How firm A would like to alter b is, however, ambiguous: an higher
b induces more sick enrollees to switch during the year, but also increases the initial
enrollment. Interestingly, in the initial enrollment decision, consumers discount b at
the rate γ < 1, but in the switching decision sick enrollees value b in full. By contrast
the premium is valued in full in both stages.
Finally, although not explicitly analyzed in this framework, it is evident that
additional institutional features like a subsidy for the high quality plan or the usage of
94
an ex post risk adjustment are potentially important elements capable of altering the
equilibrium response of insurers, and the selection of beneficiaries. In particular, both
a subsidy on plan A and a risk adjustment mechanism, equalizing the costs between
A and B post switches, could induce firm A to exploit plan switching behavior to
bolster its market share without worrying about selection. Similarly high quality
need not be reflected in health cost relevant features. For example if high quality
plans advertise and healthy consumers are more sensitive to advertising then low risk
consumers may switch to the high quality health plans mid year for reasons unrelated
to health shocks.
3.4 Data
Our analysis is based on publicly available data released by CMS describing MA and
PDP plan/contract characteristics. In addition to monthly enrollment, we observe
characteristics such as Part C and D premiums, deductible, extra coverage in the gap,
measures of drug generosity, risk scores for Part C and D and the star rating. For
this latter variable, we have both the overall summary rating, as well as the score
on each individual measure. We also use the Area Health Resource File released
by the Health Resource Service Administration to assess a number of county-level
demographic, economic and heath indicators.
The empirical analysis in the next section looks at the policy effects on enrollment.
We focus on three main outcome variables: the within-year change in enrollment, the
across-year change in enrollment, and the plan average risk score. The first variable,
calculated as the difference in the contract enrollment on December of year t and the
enrollment in January of year t, captures increased potential for plan switching during
the year. This measure thus captures the most direct effect of the policy. We also
consider the possibility of plan switching across years by calculating the difference in
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the contract enrollment on January of year t and the enrollment in December of year
t − 1. This latter variable can capture a strategic response by consumers: greater
plan switching during the regular open enrollment period driven by the possibility
of switching to a 5-star plan later. Regarding the risk score, this outcome variable
is measured as the mean contract risk score, available from CMS at yearly level.
Assessing changes in risk score is relevant to determining whether the composition of
the enrollment pool of the contracts is affected by the 5-star SEP.
Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for the analysis sample: MA plans data
aggregated at the level of contract, year and county.19 We conduct the analysis at
contract and not at plan level both because the rating does not vary among plans
under the same contract and because missing enrollment data are more common at
plan than at contract level.20 We focus on the period local to the policy, specifically
from 2009 to 2013, to assess the immediate response to the reforms implemented in
2012. The table reports statistics separately for the years 2009-2011 and 2012-2013,
and for two subsets of contracts: contracts obtaining the 5-star rating in 2012 or 2013
(our treatment group) and contracts obtaining the 4 or 4.5 rating in 2012 or 2013 and
offered in counties that do not have 5-star contracts in the same years (our control
group). On average 5-star contracts have higher enrollment, healthier enrollees and
more generous coverage than the control group. The summary statistics are suggestive
that the policy had bite in that the within-year change in enrollment responds to the
enrollment reform. The data show an increase in the within-year enrollment for 5-
star contracts in the post 2011 period relative to the previous period, but not for the
control group.21
19This table is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016).
20A subset of our measures are available only at plan level. As such we aggregate them at contract
level by weighting the plan characteristics by the enrollment of the plan. Our results are robustness
to mean aggregation, of our results to aggregation and are reported in the appendix.
21They also suggest possible effects on the plan offerings as well: Part C premiums tend to decline
more for the treatment than for the control group, while MOOP increases for 5-star contracts relative
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Finally, another feature, crucial for identification, is that the data reveal is that
the 5-star SEP did not trigger any major entry/exit of plans. Table 3.2 reports (by
year and insurer) the number of counties in which the plans achieving 5-star in 2012
or 2013 are offered.22
3.5 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we provide evidence regarding the effect of the 5-star SEP on enroll-
ment responses related to beneficiaries enrollment and risk scores. We first present
our empirical strategy and then discuss our main results, as well as the most relevant
robustness checks.
A. Empirical Strategy
To identify the effect of the 5-star SEP on enrollment, we follow a difference-in-
differences (DID) approach. For MA plans, this strategy exploits the fact, docu-
mented in Figure 3·2, that 5-star contracts are offered in only a subset of the US
counties. We consider all contracts that achieve the 5-star rating in the period 2012-
2013 as the DID treatment group (dark red areas in in Figure 3·2) and all contracts
that achieve a 4 or 4.5 rating in the same period and are offered in counties with-
out any 5-star contract as the control group (light red areas in in Figure 3·2). The
regression model that we estimate is:
Yict = ac + bt + ci + βD
5S
it + εict (3.1)
where i indicates the contract, c the county and t the year. The coefficient of interest
to control contracts which is explored in detail in Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016)
22This table is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016). Comparing 2012 to 2013, it is
clear that the 5-star plans did not reduce their presence. Indeed they seem to expand the number
of counties served, regardless the parent organization. Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016) provides
economic rational for why insurers were able to maintain their 5-star contracts. However, it is also
relevant to point out that CMS poses limits to the exit of plans as it can impose a two year ban to
a firms that retires all its contracts from MA.
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is β, the effect on the dependent variable of a dummy equal to one for 5-star contracts
after 2011, conditional on fixed effects for the county (ac), time (bt) and contract (ci).
Various extensions of this baseline model are presented below.
There are challenges to interpret β as the causal effect of the policy change. As
usual in any DID study, the first and foremost concern is to select an adequate control
group. In our setting, 4 and 4.5 star contracts offered in counties that do not have
any 5-star plan are a nearly ideal control group. Clearly, both the control and the
treatment contracts are similar as they are the top quality contracts offered in their
respective counties. Furthermore, as discussed above, contracts in the control group
face similar financial incentives of those in the treatment group, thus allowing us to
identify the effect of the 5-star SEP policy reform separately from any other effect
produced by the simultaneous payment reform.
As shown in Table 3.3, however, treatment and control groups differ along several
observable characteristics, like size of the enrollment base and features of the enroll-
ment pool.23 Indeed, although Figure 3·2 reveals that the 5-star plans are scattered
across many different counties, this does not ensure their assignment to counties is
random.24 We have two arguments to address this concern, the first is that, for the
three reasons explained in section 3, it is hard for insurers to perfectly control their
rating so that the difference between a 4-4.5 and a 5-star plan is likely quasi-random,
at least for the period object of analysis.25 Second, to the extent that the selection
into the treatment state is based on observable characteristics, we have a rich set of
covariates that permits us to control for this threat. Thus, as a robustness check
for our baseline estimates we use a matching DID strategy, where the control group
23This table is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016).
24This figure is recreated from Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016).
25We considered supplementing our DID strategy with a discontinuity design by restricting the
analysis to treated and control plans with ratings close to the 4.75 star cutoff separating 4.5 star
plans from 5-star plans. However, the paucity of plans around the cutoff renders this type of analysis
infeasible.
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observations are selected to match the characteristics of the treatment group.
Therefore, our identification strategy rests upon the fact that the assignment of
the treatment relative to the control status is quasi-random within the union of the
counties marked in dark and light red in Figure 3·2. Since the regulation separates
the geographical markets, an additional benefit of this strategy is that, by selecting
treatment and control groups from different counties, it avoids contamination issues.
B. Effect on Enrollment
The first outcome variable that we analyze is the contract-county within year enroll-
ment change. The yearly trend in this variable is shown by Figure 3·3 separately for
the treatment and control groups. There is a clear increase in the number of enrollees
for the treatment group after the introduction of the SEP, as already highlighted by
the statistics in Table 3.3.26 Even before 2012, there is a growing trend for the treated
group, relative to a declining path for the control group. Although for both groups
these year-to-year changes are not statistically significant, thus limiting potential bias
in the estimate of β, we will also report estimates including group-specific time trends
in the DID model specification.
Panel A of Table 3.4 displays our baseline DID estimates. The dependent variable
is the enrollment change between December and January both in levels (Columns 1-4)
and in percentage terms (relative to the January enrollment base) (Columns 5-8). We
estimate 4 specifications: the odd numbered columns include county and year fixed
effects, the even numbered columns add contract fixed effects. Columns 3, 4, 7 and
8 add also a linear trend at state and treatment level. The 5-star SEP has a large
and statistically significant effect on the within year change in enrollment. In our
baseline specifications, columns 1 and 2, the number of enrollees increases on average
by 225-235 enrollees. This effect is quite substantial, if, for instance, we compare
26The presence of an upward trend for the treatment group, can be explained by a number of
factors. CMS has been strongly advertising to enrollees the Star rating as measure of quality and
that could have affect the increase in the enrollment overtime.
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it to an average value of the dependent variable in the pre treatment period of 386
enrollees. When including time trends, the effect is still present, but its magnitude
is attenuated. Columns 5-8 report analogous estimates for the percentage enrollment
change. This variable allows to normalize the enrollment changes by the existing
enrollment base. The estimates that we obtain range from 7% to 9% in the baseline
specifications and from 15% to 16% when including time trends.
It is informative to know in which month of the year enrollees use the SEP. Thus,
we consider complementing the above estimates of the December minus January en-
rollment change with analogous estimates for the other months preceding December.
In Figure 3·4, we plot the estimates obtained for the same specification as in model
(2) of Table 3.4. The effect on enrollment of the SEP appears linearly increasing over
time up until October and then it flattens out. Thus enrollees seem to use the new
SEP uniformly over most of the year.
We conclude this section by describing various robustness checks presented in the
remaining panels of Table 3.4. To assess the sensitivity of our estimates to the choice
of the control group, we use a twofold approach. First, we construct a sample of
comparable contracts using propensity score matching. We use an extensive list of
socio-economical, demographic and health indicators to predict the probability that a
county has a 5-star contract in the 2012-13 period. Then, we restrict the control group
to those contracts in counties belonging to the common support of the propensity
score between the treatment and the control groups.27 Second, we further restrict the
control group to include only contracts that achieve at least the 4 star level in both
2012 and 2013, thus selecting contracts that are more likely to be comparable with
the 5-star contracts. We report the findings in Panel B and C of Table 3.4. Overall,
27We tried various specification for the propensity score and results were broadly comparable to
the reported specification. Further details as well as the probit estimates are reported in the web
appendix.
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the policy change maintains its positive and statistically significant effect.28
To further assess the robustness of our estimates, Panel D of Table 3.4 reports the
results of a placebo test. We repeat our analysis as if the 5-star SEP was introduced
in 2011 instead of 2012. To avoid potential spillovers from the true SEP, we narrowed
our exercise to the enrollment periods from 2009 to 2011. Panel D shows that, in our
first two specifications, the simulated SEP has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the within year enrollment change, but this effect vanishes once we control
for time trends. Furthermore, we do not find a statistically significant effect of the
placebo SEP on the percentage change in enrollment.
In Table 3.5, we repeat the whole analysis using as dependent variable the enroll-
ment change across years. As explained earlier, a negative effect of the policy would
be compatible with consumers acting strategically. Our estimates, however, fail to
show the presence of such strategic behavior. The coefficient that we estimate is not
statistically significant for most of the regression models and, when it is significant,
it has a positive sign.
Finally, additional robustness checks for both the within and across years enroll-
ment changes are reported in the web appendix. There we also report the analysis
for Part D plans. While no supply side changes to the payment system occurred for
PDP - thus making easier the selection of a control group - performing inference is
problematic since only 2 out of the 34 regions are treated. With this caveat in mind,
our Part D estimates are broadly in line with the findings of a positive and significant
effect of the 5-star SEP on within year enrollment change. For Part D, we also find
some evidence of a negative, although not statistically significant, effect of the 5-star
SEP on enrollment switches across years.
28In the baseline model, the effect of the 5-star SEP ranges between 146 and 241 enrollees. The
results for the percentage change in enrollment indicate an effect ranging between 8% and 22% in
the matched sample. Once we restrict the control group to 4 star in both 2012 and 2013, we still
observe a positive effect, between 5% and 12%, even if not statistically significant.
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C. Effect on Risk Score
The final piece of this first part of the analysis focuses on interactions between the
5-star SEP and the contracts risk pools. Here we analyze whether the 5-star SEP also
causes a worsening of the risk pool of 5-star contracts. The two dependent variables on
which we focus are the yearly average contract risk score that CMS releases separately
for Part C and D. Each one of the two measures is normalized to 1 for the average
risk of a TM enrollee, the higher the risk score the higher the risk (and the potential
cost) of the enrollee.
Figure 3·5 shows the evolution over time of the risk score for 5 and 4-4.5 star
contracts. For both risk score measures, there is a similar, descending trend in both
the control and treatment groups. The decline in the latter, however, appears slightly
more pronounced. This visual evidence is confirmed by the DID regression analysis
reported in Table 3.6. The 5-star SEP has a negative and highly statistically signif-
icant effect on the risk score for both Part C and D. The effect, however, is small
being in the order of 10 percent of a standard deviation of the dependent variable.29
To better quantify these effects, for Part C this is equivalent to reducing the expected
average cost per enrollee by $0.02 for each dollar spent.
This improvement in the risk pool is not necessarily surprising if one considers
carefully the timing associated with the risk score measure. The measure that we use
is a yearly average. Could it be that this variable is unable to capture in a timely
manner the high risk of those joining 5-star plans? The annual average risk score
for a plan is built up by taking all of the individual-level risk scores and averaging
them. So, when new enrollees join during year t, the risk scores of those enrollees
will be factored into the year t average risk score. Moreover, we know from Geruso
and Layton (2015) that insurers are extremely proactive in adjusting upward the risk
score of their enrollees. All this makes our measure adequate.
29Robustness checks analogous to those performed above are reported in the web appendix.
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Nevertheless, there is a lag in how often the individual-level risk scores are up-
dated. In 2013, an individual’s risk score is based on his health status (diagnoses)
from 2012. Thus, if an enrollee who used to be healthy switches to a 5-star plan
immediately after becoming sick, our measure might be able to capture his higher
risk only a year after the switch. This feature makes the current risk score system
inadequate to deal with selection driven by within-year plan changes and this problem
is especially severe in Part C where no ex post adjustment measures (like the Part D
risk corridors and reinsurance) exist.30
To account for this issue, we exploit the fact that we observe two years of data
since the inception of the policy and repeat the DID estimates iteratively dropping
from the sample one of the two post-policy years. Our expectation is that, if the
negative estimate in the risk score regressions is driven by a lag in how the score is
recorded, we will likely find that using exclusively 2013 as the post-policy year should
lead us to find less negative, if not even positive estimates relative to when we use
only 2012 as the post-policy year. The new estimates are reported in the latter two
panels of Table 3.6. In Panel B we drop 2013, while in Panel C we drop 2012. The
findings are rather surprising. Both sets of estimates confirm the negative sign of the
coefficient. Moreover, although the magnitudes are similar, there is a tendency for
the Panel C estimates to be larger in magnitude than those in Panel B. Hence, these
results confirm that the risk pool of 5-star plans improved and it is not a spurious
correlation driven by a lagged response in the risk score measures.
D. Discussion
30A more subtle problem could, in principle, involve new Medicare enrollees. Enrollees who are
enrolling in Medicare for the first time (either FFS or MA) have no diagnoses, so their risk scores are
based on age/gender only and are not particularly indicative of health status. After they have been
in Medicare for a full calendar year, their risk scores switch to being based on diagnoses instead.
However, since new Medicare enrollees aren’t actually affected by the reform we are studying since
they could join any plan during any month of the year (as long as it is the first month they enroll),
so this should not be a concern for our analysis.
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Taken together, the findings on enrollment and risk score offer a nuanced picture of
how the market responded to the 5-star SEP. Enrollees switch to 5-star plans during
the year, but the risk pool of 5-star plans, instead of worsening, slightly improves.
This fact could be explained through a combination of high risk consumers already
being enrolled in 5-star plans (i.e., before the SEP reform) and sufficiently high switch-
ing costs that lock in enrollees to their plans during the OEP. Hence, although the
enrollees that switch have higher risk relative to the ones that stay in their plan, these
switchers have nevertheless a lower risk than the consumers already enrolled in 5-star
plans.
Figure 3·6 shows evidence compatible with this argument. The figure is con-
structed by separating contracts between those that lose and those that gain enrollees
during the year and then, separately for the two subsets of contracts, calculating the
average risk score (weighting contracts by their share of switchers in-flow or out-flow).
We find that the out-flow tends to be from lower risk plans, while the inflow is toward
higher risk plans.31
A different, but not mutually exclusive explanation is that 5-star plans are attract-
ing enrollees that are not the worst risk ones in their original plans. An interesting
finding in this respect is shown by Figure 3·7 reporting the sources of the within-year
flows: TM without Part D, TM with Part D or other MA plans. The plot on the right
illustrates that for the counties with 5-star plans, it is TM without Part D to suffer
the largest outflow of enrollees during the year. Although this could be reconciled
with the explanation above if the switching cost from TM to MA is lower than that
between different MA plans, this seems rather unlikely. Indeed, what is more likely
happening is that the presence of a flow of low risk enrollees from TM is the result
of the strategic response of insurers to the 5-star SEP, considering that on average
31The fact that both for out-flow and in-flow the average risk score is below 1 is explained by
the fact that our analysis excludes the southern US regions, as illustrated in Figure 3·2, where risk
scores tend to be higher.
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MA plans tend to have a lower risk score than TM (see Curto et al. (2014)).32 In-
deed Decarolis and Guglielmo (2016) find evidence in support of insurers strategically
altering benefit design.
3.6 Conclusions
The reform that, starting in 2012, allowed Medicare enrollees to switch at any point in
time to the highest quality, 5-star plans could have backfired. By undermining the use
of rigid open enrollment periods, a pillar of most insurance markets, this policy could
have exacerbated the adverse selection faced by 5-star plans, potentially triggering
premium spikes or even plan exit. We find that, although enrollees responded to
the policy and 5-star plans enrollment grew, the naive prediction of a worsening of
selection for these plans did not materialize.
These results, based on a clean identification strategy, empirically document key
features of insurance markets. There are various implications for both research and
policy. In terms of research, our findings suggest the relevance of two main avenues
for future research. First, enrollees inertia in plan choices makes prominent the need
to better understand the drivers of plan switching behavior. Second, effective risk
adjustment systems need to take into account plan switching behavior associated with
the presence of special enrollment periods. The potential enlargement of the set of
“life qualifying events” in the ACA exchanges referenced in the introduction might
be a fruitful area to further analyze this issue. Third,
Finally, in terms of policy, our results are encouraging. The policy did result
in the 5-star SEP goal of bolstering enrollment into 5-star plans and the it did so
without worsening the risk pool of these 5-star plans. However these results do not
reveal the drivers of switching, nor do they speak to the potential effects of allowing
32This is consistent with the findings of Aizawa and Kim (2013). MA plans are able to use
advertising to attract and select, according to their risk level, new enrollees.
105
mid year switching without imposing a switch to 5-star plans. Additionally though
the increase in mid-year enrollment was substantial, this analysis looks only at the
short run and thus over time selection may differ, especially if plans adjust features
to influence their 5-star rating and if the early switchers differ from those who switch
after the policy has been around for a while.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Domain Measures for Part C and D - Year 2012
Managed Care Prescription Drugs
Staying Healthy: screenings, tests,
vaccines
12 Drug Plan Customer Service 3
Managing Chronic (long-term) Con-
ditions
9 Member Complaints, problems get-
ting services, and improvement in
the drug plan’s performance
3
Member Experience with the Health
Plan
5 Member Experience with the Drug
Plan
3
Member Complaints, problems get-
ting services, and improvement in
the health plan’s performance
3 Patient safety and accuracy of drug
pricing
6
Health Plan Customer Service 2
Notes: The table reports the list of the domain measures used to calculate the Part C and D
summary ratings in 2012. There are 5 domain measures for part C and 4 for Part D. The numbers
in the table that follow the description of each domain measure indicate the number of underlying
individual measures.
Table 3.2: Number of Counties with Treated Contracts by Insurer
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Baystate Health, Inc. 3 3 3 3 3
Group Health Cooperative 13 13 13 13 13
Gundersen Lutheran Health System Inc. 11 11 11 16 16
Humana Inc. 0 0 11 30 30
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. 63 63 64 64 64
Marshfield Clinic. 32 32 32 32 36
Martin’s Point Health Care, Inc. 12 15 16 16 18
Total 134 137 150 174 180
Notes: The table shows the number of counties in which the treated contracts where offered. Treated
contracts are contracts that achieve the 5-star rating in 2012 or 2013.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Part C
2009-2011
Control Treament
Mean s.d. Median N Mean s.d. Median N
Tot. Enrollment 1338.7 4176.5 196.3 4796 7129.7 17910.4 888 409
Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan. 92.38 378.3 27 4796 386.0 863.7 117.5 409
% Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan. 0.350 0.743 0.147 4796 0.301 0.721 0.068 409
Premium Part C 497.3 467.0 435.5 4796 754.9 408.6 838.9 409
Premium Part D 333.9 210.9 348.8 4796 232.9 140.7 255.6 409
In Network MOOP 3838 1084.3 3400 1696 2781.4 604.8 2682 148
N. Top Drugs 95.20 5.973 94 4765 83.17 14.92 90 409
N. Unrestricted Drug 532.6 130.5 520 4765 641.4 102.4 641 409
Deductible Part D 44.59 94.41 0 4796 21.34 61.12 0 409
Risk Score Part C 0.965 0.229 0.908 4796 0.925 0.109 0.965 409
Risk Score Part D 0.934 0.111 0.915 4796 0.882 0.044 0.880 409
Part C OOPC Excellent 823.2 197.7 807.9 4425 800.2 110.8 801.2 409
Part C OOPC Poor 1763.5 529.9 1730.2 4425 1632.6 393.2 1643.3 409
Drug OOPC - Excellent 592.2 145.8 597.2 4425 720.7 151.0 777.3 409
Drug OOPC - Poor 1974.9 645.2 1972.9 4425 2455.9 687.5 2552 409
Health Care Quality 4.048 0.788 4 4658 4.748 0.435 5 397
Customer Service 3.809 1.128 4 3660 4.698 0.492 5 397
Drug Access 4.163 0.838 4 4654 4.952 0.214 5 397
2012-2013
Control Treament
Mean s.d. Median N Mean s.d. Median N
Tot. Enrollment 1265.5 3753.6 236 4300 8636.0 21040.4 1320 263
Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan. 55.68 228.7 13 4300 569.6 1364.1 122.1 263
% Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan. 0.133 0.327 0.066 4300 0.101 0.110 0.0674 263
Premium Part C 427.7 423.1 374.3 4300 632.1 349.8 647.1 263
Premium Part D 310.3 223.8 306 4300 213.1 165.8 210.4 263
In Network MOOP 3755.6 991.6 3400 4026 3362.9 1124.3 3400.0 263
N. Top Drugs 87.05 3.757 88 4274 89.31 3.132 88 263
N. Unrestricted Drug 415.2 123.5 409.4 4274 415.6 75.30 389 263
Deductible Part D 40.54 89.19 0 4300 30.68 73.59 0 263
Risk Score Part C 0.953 0.196 0.900 4299 0.907 0.0913 0.930 263
Risk Score Part D 0.909 0.0967 0.893 4299 0.857 0.043 0.854 263
Part C OOPC Excellent 979.0 192.5 998.2 4033 989.8 121.2 1009.2 263
Part C OOPC Poor 2225.2 412.7 2286.9 4033 2172.4 372.3 2121.5 263
Drug OOPC - Excellent 624.8 130.9 618.0 4033 629.7 207.5 524.8 263
Drug OOPC - Poor 2399.0 546.6 2367.9 4033 2312.6 989.2 2163.6 263
Health Care Quality 4.236 0.622 4 4267 4.817 0.387 5 263
Customer Service 3.926 1.033 4 4219 4.319 1.225 5 263
Drug Access 3.908 1.015 4 4272 4.669 0.929 5 263
Notes: the unit of observation is Contract/County/Year. The top panel include observation from 2009 to 2011. The bottom panel
include observations from 2012 to 2013. The “Treatment” sample includes observation from Contract with 5 Star Rating in either 2012
or 2013. The “Control” sample include contracts with either 4 Star in either 2012 or 2013 in counties without 5 Star Contract. “Tot.
Enrollment” is the contract enrollment measures as January. “Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan” is the change in enrollment from January
to December. “% Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan” is the percentage change in enrollment from January to December. “Premium Part C”
is the annual Premium for Part C. “Premium Part D” is the annual Premium for Part D. “In Network MOOP” is the maximum outside
of pocket expenditure for in network service, excluding Part D drugs (we observe it starting from 2011). “Deductible Part D” is the
maximum annual amount of initial out of pocket expenses for Part D drugs. “N. Top Drugs” is the number of top drugs (out of 117 most
frequently purchased) included in the plan formulary. “N. Unrestricted Drug” is the number of drugs without restriction on utilization
included in the plan formulary. “Risk Score Part C” is the average risk score measure for Part C coverage. “Risk Score Part D” is
the average risk score measure for Part D. “Part C OOPC Excellent (Poor)” is the average yearly out-of-pocket for individuals with
Excellent (Poor) heath status for Part C coverage. “Drug OOPC Excellent (Poor)” is the average yearly out-of-pocket for individuals
with Excellent (Poor) heath status for Part coverage. “Health Care Quality” is a star rating (1-5), over member’s evaluation of health
care quality (CAHPS Survey). “Customer Service” is a star rating (1-5), over ability of the health plan to provide information or help
when members need it (CAHPS Survey). “Drug Access” is a star rating (1-5) over the ease of getting prescriptions filled when using the
plan (CAHPS Survey). “Tot. Enrollment”, “Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan”, “% Change Enrollment Dec.-Jan’, “Health Care Quality”,
“Customer Service” and “Drug Access” are measured at contract level. “Premium Part C”, “Premium Part D”, “In Network MOOP”,
“Deductible Part D”, “N. Top Drugs”, “N. Unrestricted Drug”, “Part C OOPC Excellent (Poor)”, “ Drug OOPC Excellent (Poor)”,
“Risk Score Part C” and “Risk Score Part D” are measured at plan level and aggregated at contract level as weighted average, with
enrollment as weights. Plan with less than 10 enrollees are imputed 5 enrollees.
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Table 3.4: MA Contracts - Within Year Enrollment Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Baseline Sample
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 224.327*** 235.741*** 86.860** 86.131** 0.074* 0.089** 0.165** 0.155**
(50.125) (48.533) (39.527) (37.405) (0.044) (0.042) (0.075) (0.070)
Observations 9,768 9,768 9,768 9,768 9,768 9,768 9,768 9,768
R-squared 0.553 0.620 0.564 0.630 0.196 0.281 0.229 0.313
Panel B Matched Sample
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 145.972*** 153.032*** 63.519** 60.888** 0.089* 0.099** 0.219*** 0.202***
(25.732) (25.236) (25.683) (24.662) (0.046) (0.046) (0.079) (0.075)
Observations 7,616 7,616 7,616 7,616 7,616 7,616 7,616 7,616
R-squared 0.461 0.548 0.475 0.562 0.185 0.272 0.220 0.308
Panel C: 4-4.5 Both Years Sample
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
Star 5 227.579*** 234.389*** 82.132** 79.196** 0.046 0.058 0.119 0.107
(50.612) (48.910) (39.792) (37.513) (0.045) (0.043) (0.078) (0.073)
Observations 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674
R-squared 0.704 0.731 0.719 0.745 0.231 0.297 0.285 0.352
Panel D: Placebo
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 108.113*** 116.613*** 15.924 15.130 -0.038 0.015 0.155 0.102
(33.168) (30.406) (46.024) (42.162) (0.065) (0.059) (0.110) (0.099)
Observations 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205 5,205
R-squared 0.469 0.618 0.478 0.630 0.277 0.428 0.311 0.464
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Time Trend NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: The table reports the DID estimates of the effect of the 5-star SEP. The outcome variable
is the difference in the contract enrollment between December and January (of the same year)
calculated either in levels (first four columns) or in percentage (latter four columns). The four
model specifications considered for each dependent variable differ in the set of controls used, as
reported in the block at the very end of the table. Panel A reports the estimates for the baseline
sample: treatment group contracts with 5-star in 2012 or 2013; control group contracts with more
4 or 4.5 star in 2012 or 2013 in counties without 5-star contracts. Panel B reports the estimates
for a sample matched using a propensity score. The probability that a county has a 5-star contract
is estimated over a range of socio-economical, demographic and health indicators of the counties.
Only the county on common support of the propensity score between the treatment and the control
groups are included. Panel C, treatment group contracts with 5-star in 2012 or 2013; control group
contracts with 4 or 4.5 star in both 2012 and 2013 in counties without 5-star contracts. Panel D,
placebo test, over the year 2009-2011 with a simulated policy introduced in 2011 (same sample as
Panel A). Standard errors in parentheses clustered at county level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.5: MA Contracts - Across Years Enrollment Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Baseline Sample
Jan.-Dec. Enrollment Change Jan.-Dec. Enrollment % Change
5 Star -2.072 0.272 21.254 22.616 0.044 0.039 0.186*** 0.204***
(15.362) (15.002) (26.370) (24.777) (0.037) (0.033) (0.054) (0.052)
Observations 8,823 8,823 8,823 8,823 8,823 8,823 8,823 8,823
R-squared 0.079 0.121 0.088 0.130 0.143 0.219 0.148 0.225
Panel B: Matched Sample
Jan.-Dec. Enrollment Change Jan.-Dec. Enrollment % Change
Star 5 8.495 10.458 8.776 8.914 0.065 0.057 0.243*** 0.261***
(13.164) (12.988) (19.117) (18.275) (0.040) (0.036) (0.056) (0.055)
Observations 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094 7,094
R-squared 0.138 0.190 0.167 0.220 0.118 0.204 0.124 0.212
Panel C: 4-4.5 Both Years Sample
Jan.-Dec. Enrollment Change Jan.-Dec. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 2.032 1.267 5.136 3.585 -0.027 -0.041 0.019 0.017
(17.416) (16.864) (39.290) (37.351) (0.031) (0.025) (0.035) (0.032)
Observations 5,407 5,407 5,407 5,407 5,407 5,407 5,407 5,407
R-squared 0.093 0.127 0.100 0.134 0.191 0.250 0.206 0.263
Panel D: Placebo
Jan.-Dec. Enrollment Change Jan.-Dec. Enrollment % Change
Star 5 -16.327 -13.821 -95.281** -90.711*** -0.176*** -0.094** 0.009 0.027
(19.684) (18.303) (37.429) (32.715) (0.054) (0.048) (0.106) (0.087)
Observations 4,636 4,636 4,636 4,636 4,636 4,636 4,636 4,636
R-squared 0.090 0.172 0.092 0.174 0.197 0.391 0.204 0.395
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Time Trend NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: The table reports the DID estimates of the effect of the 5-star SEP. The outcome variable
is the difference in the contract enrollment between January and December (of consecutive years)
calculated either in levels (first four columns) or in percentage (latter four columns). Panel A reports
the estimates for the baseline sample: treatment group contracts with 5-star in 2012 or 2013; control
group contracts with more 4 or 4.5 star in 2012 or 2013 in counties without 5-star contracts. Panel
B reports the estimates for a sample matched using a propensity score. The probability that a
county has a 5-star contract is estimated over a range of socio-economical, demographic and health
indicators of the counties. Only the county on common support of the propensity score between the
treatment and the control groups are included. Panel C, treatment group contracts with 5-star in
2012 or 2013; control group contracts with 4 or 4.5 star in both 2012 and 2013 in counties without
5-star contracts. Panel D, placebo test, over the year 2009-2011 with a simulated policy introduced
in 2011 (same sample as Panel A). Standard errors in parentheses clustered at county level ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3.6: MA Contracts - Risk Score Part C and D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Baseline Sample
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
5 Star -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 9,767 9,767 9,767 9,767 9,767 9,767 9,767 9,767
R-squared 0.349 0.949 0.354 0.953 0.349 0.930 0.354 0.935
Panel B: 2012 Effect
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
5 Star -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.015*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 7,372 7,372 7,372 7,372 7,372 7,372 7,372 7,372
R-squared 0.355 0.954 0.361 0.959 0.363 0.937 0.368 0.942
Panel C: 2013 Effect
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
5 Star -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.032*** -0.013 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.012**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600
R-squared 0.356 0.951 0.361 0.955 0.366 0.928 0.371 0.934
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Time Trend NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: The table reports the DID estimates of the effect of the 5-star SEP. The outcome variable
is the risk score for Part C (first four columns) and Part D (latter four columns). The four model
specifications considered for each dependent variable differ in the set of controls used, as reported
in the block at the very end of the table. Panel A reports the estimates for the baseline sample:
treatment group contracts with 5-star in 2012 or 2013; control group contracts with more 4 or 4.5
star in 2012 or 2013 in counties without 5-star contracts. Panel B reports estimates from a sample
without observation from 2013. Panel C reports estimates from a sample without observation from
2012. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at county level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 3·1: Enrollment Shares with and without Policy
Notes: The two figures show the allocation of consumers to A, B and the outside option TM. There
is a unit mass of consumers who are sorted in the figure by their value of α, from the lowest (zero)
to the highest (one).
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Figure 3·3: MA Contracts - Within Year Enrollment Change
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Notes: Evolution of the Dec. minus Jan. contract enrollment variable for both treatment and control
contracts.
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Figure 3·4: MA Contracts - Monthly Enrollment Change Relative to
January
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Notes: Estimate of the effect of the 5-star SEP on within year enrollment change, calculated at all
months. The last value on the horizontal axis (12) represents the Dec. minus Jan. enrollment, the
next value (11) represents the Nov. minus Jan. enrollment, and so on until (2) that represent the
Feb. minus Jan. enrollment. The value for the Dec. minus Jan. enrollment is the same reported
in the second column of Panel A in Table 3.4. All other estimates are obtained using the same
specification.
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Figure 3·5: MA Contracts - Evolution of the Risk Score Measures
(a) Risk Score Part C
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(b) Risk Score Part D
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Figure 3·6: Average Risk Score of Contracts with Net Inflow or Out-
flow of Enrollees
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Figure 3·7: Sources of the Enrollees Inflow/Outflow by Program
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Table A.1: Border Sample: Probability of Prescription Opioid Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0}
Closeness -0.046 -0.47∗∗
(0.075) (0.20)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.13∗ -0.29∗∗
(0.067) (0.11)
PDMP 0.026 0.038
(0.065) (0.064)
MML -0.10∗∗ -0.11∗∗
(0.048) (0.047)
Constant 11.8∗∗∗ 11.8∗∗∗ 9.81∗∗∗ 9.80∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.53) (0.53)
Person FE X X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X
Obs 6,932,940 6,932,940 6,932,940 6,932,940
y¯ 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7
R2a 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for filling at least one opioid prescription, scaled
by 100, thus coefficients represent a percentage point change in the likelihood of at least one opioid
prescription from a one unit increase in the right hand side variable. MML is an indicator for
the existence of a state medical marijuana law and PDMP is an indicator for the existence of a
state prescription drug monitoring program. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011
to 2014 and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI or VT and within 75 miles
of a bordering state with no dispensary access or in on of the no dispensary access bordered states
within 75 miles of CT, ME, NJ, RI or VT. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level,
in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.2: Border Sample: Day Supply of Prescription Opioids For
Pre-Access Users
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days Supply Days Supply Days Supply Days Supply
Closeness -1.13∗∗∗ -1.64∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.33)
1{d ≤ 25} -1.02∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.22)
PDMP 0.17 0.099
(0.11) (0.11)
MML 0.030 0.070
(0.071) (0.071)
Constant 12.8∗∗∗ 12.9∗∗∗ 11.0∗∗∗ 11.0∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.083) (0.87) (0.87)
Person FE X X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X
Obs 3,140,520 3,140,520 3,140,520 3,140,520
y¯ 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7
R2a 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Notes: Dependent variable is the day supply of prescription opioids from filled prescriptions during
the quarter-year. MML is an indicator for the existence of a state medical marijuana law and PDMP
is an indicator for the existence of a state prescription drug monitoring program. Observations are
beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011 to 2014 and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT,
ME, NJ, RI or VT, and within 75 miles of a bordering state with no dispensary access, or in on
of the no dispensary access bordered states, within 75 miles of CT, ME, NJ, RI or VT, who filled
at least one opioid prescription before having a dispensary in their state within 100 miles of them.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, ***
p <0.01
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Table A.3: Use Transition: Within 25 Miles Aggregate Time Trend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No Use Light Use Light-Mod Mod-Heavy Heavy Use
1{d ≤ 25} -0.66∗∗∗ -0.0034 0.34∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.057) (0.050) (0.041) (0.030)
#1{pre type = L} 3.09∗∗∗ -2.92∗∗∗ -1.24∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗
(0.43) (0.32) (0.29) (0.21) (0.11)
#1{pre type = LM} 8.94∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -8.79∗∗∗ 0.038 0.85∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.32) (0.53) (0.46) (0.27)
#1{pre type = MH} 12.5∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ -1.15∗∗ -11.2∗∗∗ -1.22∗∗
(0.60) (0.19) (0.45) (0.72) (0.54)
#1{pre type = H} 9.07∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 0.60∗ 0.066 -11.0∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.20) (0.33) (0.79) (0.87)
Constant 87.6∗∗∗ 4.10∗∗∗ 2.97∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗ 2.07∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.082)
State Controls X X X X X
Person FE X X X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X X X X
Obs 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483
y¯ 87.0 4.09 3.21 3.41 2.34
R2a 0.51 0.068 0.23 0.49 0.59
Notes: Dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, in Column 2 is
an indicator for [1,10] day supply of opioids, in Column 3 is an indicator for [11,45] day supply of
opioids, in Column 4 is an indicator for [46,90] day supply of opioids and in Column 5 is an indicator
for at least 91 day supply of opioids in the quarter-year. In each Column the dependent variable is
scaled by 100 and thus coefficients represent the percentage point change in the likelihood of the day
supply of prescription opioids being at the Columns use level from a one unit increase in the right
hand side variable. Beneficiary pre-types are defined according to opioid prescriptions in the first
quarter of 2011, using the aforementioned cutoffs, and #1{pre type = τ} is the interaction between
and pre-type τ and the indicator for a dispensary within 25 miles of the beneficiary, 1{d ≤ 25}. The
omitted interaction is the no opioid prescription pre-type. State controls include MML, an indicator
for the existence of a state medical marijuana law, and PDMP, an indicator for the existence of a
state prescription drug monitoring program. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from the
second quarter of 2011 through 2014 and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ,
RI and VT. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, **
p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.4: Change in Uptake and Efficacy of ORT: Dispensary Access
Within 25 Miles: Aggregate Time Trend
(1) (2) (3)
No Use Opioid Replacement
1{d ≤ 25} -0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ -0.0026
(0.084) (0.084) (0.010)
#1{pre dep = O} 7.81∗∗∗ -7.95∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.046)
#1{pre dep = R} 6.16∗∗∗ 2.10 -8.27∗∗∗
(2.15) (1.84) (2.57)
Constant 87.6∗∗∗ 12.1∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.027)
State Controls X X X
Person FE X X X
Quarter-Year FE X X X
Obs 1,881,483 1,881,483 1,881,483
y¯ 87.0 12.9 0.19
R2a 0.51 0.50 0.73
Notes: Dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, in Column 2
is an indicator for at least one opioid prescription and no opioid replacement therapy prescriptions
(ORT) and in Column 3 is an indicator for at least one ORT prescription. In each Column the
dependent variable is scaled by 100 and thus coefficients represent the percentage point change in
the likelihood of no opioid prescriptions in Column 1, of at least one opioid prescription but no
ORT prescriptions in Column 2 and of at least one ORT prescription in Column 3 from a one unit
increase in the right hand side variable. Beneficiary pre-dependence-types are defined according to
prescriptions in the first quarter of 2011, using the aforementioned categories, and #1{pre dep = τ}
is the interaction between and pre-dependence-type τ and an indicator for a dispensary within 25
miles of the beneficiary, 1{d ≤ 25}. The omitted interaction is the no opioid prescription pre-
dependence-type. State controls include MML, an indicator for the existence of a state medical
marijuana law, and PDMP, an indicator for the existence of a state prescription drug monitoring
program. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from the second quarter of 2011 through 2014
and the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.5: Pooled Cross-section: Demographics and Prescription
Opioids.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} Days Supply Days Supply
Closeness -0.40∗ -1.36∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.38)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.23∗ -0.53∗∗
(0.12) (0.26)
Demographics
64<Age≤70 -7.77∗∗∗ -7.77∗∗∗ -14.3∗∗∗ -14.3∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.25) (0.63) (0.63)
Age>70 -10.5∗∗∗ -10.5∗∗∗ -19.6∗∗∗ -19.6∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.59) (0.59)
Male -1.04∗∗∗ -1.04∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗ 0.77∗∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.36) (0.36)
LIS 5.61∗∗∗ 5.61∗∗∗ 10.2∗∗∗ 10.2∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17) (0.43) (0.43)
Race
Black -0.41 -0.41 -2.62∗∗∗ -2.62∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.79) (0.79)
Hispanic -4.04∗∗∗ -4.04∗∗∗ -10.8∗∗∗ -10.8∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.41) (0.91) (0.91)
Asian -7.18∗∗∗ -7.18∗∗∗ -12.1∗∗∗ -12.1∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.28) (0.98) (0.98)
Other -3.74∗∗∗ -3.74∗∗∗ -5.65∗∗∗ -5.65∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.37) (1.18) (1.18)
Conditions
Cancer 4.97∗∗∗ 4.97∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.46) (0.94) (0.94)
MS 4.22∗∗ 4.22∗∗ 4.33 4.33
(2.06) (2.06) (4.04) (4.04)
Fibromyalgia 25.9∗∗∗ 25.9∗∗∗ 24.1∗∗∗ 24.1∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.53) (0.92) (0.92)
Arthritis 8.99∗∗∗ 8.99∗∗∗ 8.56∗∗∗ 8.56∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.68) (1.32) (1.32)
Shingles 13.4∗∗∗ 13.4∗∗∗ 6.28∗∗∗ 6.28∗∗∗
(0.59) (0.59) (1.28) (1.28)
HIV 8.56∗∗∗ 8.56∗∗∗ 12.1∗∗∗ 12.1∗∗∗
(1.40) (1.40) (2.86) (2.86)
Renal Failure 10.7∗∗∗ 10.7∗∗∗ -4.56∗∗∗ -4.56∗∗∗
(0.84) (0.84) (1.41) (1.41)
Constant 19.9∗∗∗ 19.9∗∗∗ 26.9∗∗∗ 26.4∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.50) (2.28) (2.28)
ZIP code FE X X X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X X X
Obs 2,007,160 2,007,160 684,512 684,512
y¯ 13.0 13.0 19.6 19.6
R2a 0.073 0.073 0.16 0.16
Notes: Dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, scaled by 100, thus
coefficients represent the percentage point change in the likelihood of at least one opioid prescriptions from a one
unit increase in the right hand side variable. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the day supply of opioids
from filled prescriptions. The omitted age group is those less than 65 years old, in particular these are the disabled
beneficiaries. The omitted race is White. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011 through 2014 and in
Columns 1 and 2 the sample consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT. In Columns 3 and 4 the
sample is restricted to beneficiaries with positive opioid use pre-dispensary access. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the ZIP code level, in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.6: Subsamples: Heterogeneity in the Effect of Access to
Dispensaries on Prescription Opioids
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Days > 0} 1{Days > 0} Days Supply Days Supply
Seniors
Closeness -0.40∗ -1.30∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.29)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.18 -0.47∗∗
(0.12) (0.20)
y¯ 9.9 9.9 12.0 12.0
Disabled
Closeness -0.055 -1.83∗
(0.57) (1.00)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.36 -1.48∗∗
(0.32) (0.67)
y¯ 27 27 41.8 41.8
Low Income Subsidy
Closeness -0.71∗∗ -2.18∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.64)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.48∗∗ -1.28∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.43)
y¯ 18 18 29.1 29.1
Unsubsidized
Closeness -0.070 -0.93∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.35)
1{d ≤ 25} -0.027 -0.27
(0.11) (0.23)
y¯ 9.4 9.4 11.8 11.8
Person FE X X X X
State-Quarter-Year FE X X X X
Notes: Dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for no opioid prescriptions, scaled by 100, thus
coefficients represent the percentage point change in the likelihood of at least one opioid prescriptions from a one
unit increase in the right hand side variable. In Columns 3 and 4 the dependent variable is the day supply of opioids
from filled prescriptions. Observations are beneficiary-quarter-years from 2011 through 2014 and in Columns 1 and
2 the subsamples consists of beneficiaries living in CT, ME, NJ, RI and VT satisfying the subsample criteria. In
Columns 3 and 4 the subsample is further restricted to beneficiaries with positive opioid use pre-dispensary access.
The Seniors subsample consists of beneficiaries who are at least 65 years old, in the first quarter of 2011, while the
Disabled subsample consists of beneficiaries who are younger then 65 years of age. The Low Income Subsidy subsample
consists of beneficiaries who receive any income based premium subsidization and the Unsubsidized sample consists
of beneficiaries who receive no such premium subsidization. Robust standard errors, clustered at the ZIP code level,
in parenthesis. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table A.8: Dispensaries in Study States
Opened
Business Name ZIP code State Month Year
The Healing Corner, Inc. 06010 CT 9 2014
Prime Wellness of Connecticut, LLC 06074 CT 9 2014
Arrow Alternative Care, Inc. 06120 CT 9 2014
Thames Valley Apothecary, LLC 06382 CT 9 2014
D & B Wellness, LLC 06606 CT 9 2014
Bluepoint Apothecary, LLC 06405 CT 10 2014
Remedy Compassion Center 04210 ME 1 2011
Canuvo, Inc 04005 ME 3 2011
Safe Alternatives 04739 ME 4 2011
Maine Organic Therapy 04605 ME 7 2011
Wellness Connection 04861 ME 9 2011
Wellness Connection 04347 ME 12 2011
Wellness Connection 04412 ME 3 2012
Wellness Connection 04101 ME 5 2012
Greenleaf Compassion Center 07042 NJ 12 2012
Compassionate Care Foundation 08234 NJ 10 2013
Garden State Dispensary 07095 NJ 11 2013
Greenleaf Compassionate Care Center 02871 RI 3 2013
Thomas C. Slater Compassion Center 02904 RI 4 2013
Summit Medical Compassion Center 02886 RI 11 2014
Champlain Valley Dispensary 05401 VT 6 2013
Vermonts Patients Alliance 05602 VT 6 2013
Rutland County Organics 05733 VT 10 2013
Southern Vermont Wellness 05301 VT 2 2014
Notes: Own data collection. Panel of dispensaries in study states from 2011-2014. ATC is short for
Alternative Care Center.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Data and Institutions
The dataset was assembled from data made publicly available by CMS (Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services). This is the same dataset as use in Decarolis and
Guglielmo (2016). In particular, data on monthly enrollment for the years 2009-2013
at plan level was downloaded from:
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/index.html.
The Crosswalk Files available from the same web site were used to link plans through
the years. Premiums and plan financial characteristics are from the Premium Files :
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/
PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/index.html.
Plans formulary and pharmacy network are from the FRF (Formulary Reference
Files):
https://www.cms.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/03_RxContracting_
FormularyGuidance.asp
Part C and D performance data determining the star ratings were obtained from:
https://www.cms.gov/medicare/prescription-drug-coverage/
prescriptiondrugcovgenin/performancedata.html
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Demographic characteristics for the geographic areas are the only ancillary data source
and were obtained from:
http://ahrf.hrsa.gov/download.htm.
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The calculation of the star rating described in the main text is illustrated below
in greater details for the case of the Part D rating for year 2012. A weighted average
of the scores earned on each of the individual measures determines the final score.
Table B.1: Rating Calculation for Part D - Year 2012
Individual Measures Domain
Measures
Summary
MeasuresDefinition Type of Data Weights
D01 Call Center - Hold Time Call Center Monitored
by CMS
1.5
Domain 1
Drug Plan Cus-
tomer Service
Summary
Rating
D02 Call Center - Foreign Language In-
terpreter
Call Center Monitored
by CMS
1.5
D03 Appeals Auto-Forward Independent Review
Entity
1.5
D04 Appeals Upheld Independent Review
Entity
1.5
D05 Enrollment Timeliness Medicare Advantage
Prescription Drug
System (CMS)
1
D06 - Complaints about the Drug Plan Complaint Tracking
System (CMS)
1.5 Domain 2
Member Com-
plaints, Prob-
lems Getting
Services, and
Choosing to
Leave the Plan
D07 - Beneficiary Access and Performance
Problems
CMS Administrative
Data
1.5
D08 - Members Choosing to Leave the
Plan
Medicare Beneficiary
Database Suite of Sys-
tems (CMS)
1.5
D09 - Getting Information From Drug
Plan
CAHPS Survey 1.5 Domain 3
Experience with
Drug PlanD10 - Rating of Drug Plan CAHPS Survey 1.5
D11 - Getting Needed Prescription Drugs CAHPS Survey 1.5
D12 - MPF Composite Prescription Drug
Event, Medicare Plan
Finder, Health Man-
agement Plan System
and Medispan
1
Domain 4
Drug Pricing
and Patient
Safety
D13 - High Risk Medication Prescription Drug
Event
3
D14 - Diabetes Treatment Prescription Drug
Event
3
D15 - Part D Medication Adherence for
Oral Diabetes Medications
Prescription Drug
Event
3
D16 - Part D Medication Adherence for
Hypertension (ACEI or ARB)
Prescription Drug
Event
3
D17 - Part D Medication Adherence for
Cholesterol (Statins)
Prescription Drug
Event
3
Notes: The table reports the details of how the 2012 summary rating is calculated for Part D. There
are three sets of measures: individual measures (17 measures, reported in the first column), domain
measures (4 measures, reported in the fourth column) and the final summary rating (fifth column).
The third column describes the weights associated to each of 17 the individual measures in the
calculation of the corresponding domain measures. The 4 domain measures are equally weighted in
the calculation of the summary rating.
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B.2 Baseline Framework: Details
This section reports the details of the baseline framework presented in the text. Given
the assumptions on consumers utility stated in the text, in the pre-policy period, a
consumer will choose B over the TM when µ− pB +αi > −γ, inducing a cutoff point
αB>TM = pB−µ−γ. A consumer will choose A over B when µ−pA+γ(αi+b) > µ−pB,
inducing a cutoff point αA>B = −b+ pA−pBγ . As regards insurers, we assume that for
each firm the cost of enrolling a consumer is zero if he turns out to be healthy and c
if sick. Firms set premiums to solve:
max
pB
piB = (αA>B − αB>TM)(pB − γc) and max
pA
piA = (1− αA>B)(pA − γc)
Denoting the equilibrium prices as (p∗B, p
∗
A), the equilibrium cutoffs are αB>TM =
p∗B − µ − γ and αA>B = −b + p
∗
A−p∗B
γ
. The top panel of Figure 3·1 describes the
resulting market shares.
In the post-policy period, given that consumers are initially unaware of the policy
change, the initial choice cutoffs αA>B and αB>TM are the same functions as above.
However, once the policy is revealed consumers from the outside option will switch to
A if −αi−hi < µ−pA+hi(αi+b)−φTM→A. Switching to A is a dominated choice for
healthy consumers and, hence, the subset of TM enrollees switching to A is composed
by those that turn out to be sick and who have −αi − 1 < µ− pA + αi + b− φO→A,
inducing a cutoff αTM→A =
pA−b−µ+φO→A−1
2
.
Similarly, consumers from B find switching to A suboptimal when healthy, but
sick consumers switch when their α is such that: µ − pB < µ − pA − φB→A + α + b,
inducing a cutoff point αB→A = pA − pB − b + φB→A. Given this demand, firms set
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premiums to solve:
max
pB
(αB→A − αB>TM)(pB − γc) + (1− γ)(αA>B − αB→A)(pB) and
max
pA
(1− αA>B)(pA − γc) + γ(αA>B − αB→A)(pA − c) + γ(αB>TM − αTM→A)(pA − c).
The ensuing equilibrium market shares can be found by inserting the resulting
equilibrium prices into the four cutoff functions: αTM→A, αB>TM , αB→A and αA>B.
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B.3 Additional Results and Robustness Checks
• The first set of additional results reported concerns the probit estimates used
for the construction of the matched DID estimates in the enrollment analysis.
Table B.2 reports the estimates for four model specifications (i.e., columns 1-
2, 3-4, 5 and 6) where we gradually increase the set of controls. All controls
are county-level demographic characteristics collected from the AHRF files of
the Health Resources and Services Administration. The estimates reported in
column 2 and 4 differ from those in columns 1 and 3, respectively, for the sample
of counties included: due to missing data for some characteristics, for columns 2
and 4 we use a smaller sample than that used for columns 1 and 3. The sample
used for columns 2 and 4 is the same used for columns 5 and 6. The matched
DID reported in the main text are based on the estimates in column 6 of Table
B.2. Although this table clearly shows that estimates are fairly stable across
models, to further assess the robustness of the DID in the main text we report
in Table B.3 matched DID estimates based on the outcomes of the three other
probit models (i.e. model 1, 3 and 5). Overall, the results are broadly in line
with what is reported in the main text.
• Table B.4 complements Table 6 in the main text by reporting for the Part C and
D risk score measures the three types of robustness checks performed for the
enrollment measures (see panels B, C and D of Table 4 and 5). The negative and
significant effect reported in the main text is robust to these robustness checks.
Regarding the placebo test, we observe diverging effect on the risk score for
Part C and D, that could be explain by other underlying trend in the market.
• Table B.5 reports the estimates of the enrollment analysis for Part D: within-
year and across years demand for PDP. As mentioned in the text, for PDP a
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major difficulty to apply the DID approach is that only 2 regions out of 34 are
treated. As result, we face a limit to our capacity to conduct inference given
the small number of treated units.1 Even under this caveat it is interesting to
note that the Part D findings resemble the Pact C ones: within-year enrollment
increases (columns 1-4) and by a magnitude similar to what found for Part C
(roughly by 10 percent of the enrollment base). The across-years enrollment of
5 star contracts declines, but in a way that is not statistically significant.
1See Timothy G. Conley and Christopher R. Taber, ”Inference with ’Difference in Differences’
with a Small Number of Policy Changes,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 2011, 93 (1): 113-25.
132
Table B.2: Probit Results - Probability of County Having 5 Star Plan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
5 Star County 5 Star County 5 Star County 5 Star County 5 Star County 5 Star County
MA Enrollees 2.981*** 2.334*** 2.858*** 2.268*** 2.234*** 2.255***
(0.448) (0.484) (0.454) (0.487) (0.513) (0.518)
Pop. Male> 65 0.000951*** 0.00126*** 0.000896*** 0.00120*** 0.00100* 0.00105*
(0.000333) (0.000461) (0.000317) (0.000456) (0.000555) (0.000600)
Pop. Female> 65 -0.000787*** -0.000973*** -0.000747*** -0.000921*** -0.000836** -0.000878**
(0.000245) (0.000328) (0.000236) (0.000324) (0.000392) (0.000430)
Pop. White-Male> 65 -0.000890** -0.00119** -0.000851** -0.00114** -0.00111* -0.00118*
(0.000361) (0.000489) (0.000344) (0.000484) (0.000592) (0.000645)
Pop. White-Female> 65 0.000573** 0.000780** 0.000542** 0.000739** 0.000653 0.000705
(0.000255) (0.000348) (0.000242) (0.000344) (0.000413) (0.000451)
Medicare Eligibles 8.13e-05*** 6.55e-05*** 8.25e-05*** 6.47e-05** 0.000149*** 0.000150***
(2.38e-05) (2.53e-05) (2.46e-05) (2.62e-05) (3.80e-05) (4.09e-05)
Unemployment 0.0519** 0.0488* 0.0305 0.0289
(0.0254) (0.0267) (0.0285) (0.0289)
Poverty Rate -0.0321** -0.0241 -0.0110 -0.0104
(0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0162)
# Medicare Cert Hosp. 0.216*** 0.110
(0.0660) (0.256)
# Hosp. Med Patients -2.32e-05*** -2.63e-05***
(4.15e-06) (4.87e-06)
# Outpatients Visits 1.50e-07 1.03e-07
(2.17e-07) (2.41e-07)
Hosp. Util. Rate 0-39 -0.0999
(0.270)
Hosp. Util. Rate 40-59 0.144
(0.262)
Hosp. Util. Rate 60-79 0.296
(0.262)
Hosp. Util. Rate>80 0.330
(0.283)
Constant -1.762*** -1.588*** -1.756*** -1.681*** -1.960*** -1.922***
(0.109) (0.120) (0.241) (0.268) (0.291) (0.295)
Observations 987 841 987 841 841 841
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
133
Table B.3: MA Contracts - Within Year Enrollment Change -
Matched Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Model 1
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 212.267*** 222.275*** 79.771** 78.749** 0.078* 0.089** 0.154** 0.140*
(49.064) (48.172) (38.894) (37.235) (0.044) (0.043) (0.075) (0.072)
Observations 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486 8,486
R-squared 0.635 0.686 0.647 0.697 0.193 0.272 0.224 0.305
Panel B: Model 3
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
5 Star 210.904*** 221.579*** 80.953** 80.095** 0.073* 0.087** 0.156** 0.144**
(49.086) (48.160) (38.891) (37.213) (0.044) (0.043) (0.075) (0.072)
Observations 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734 8,734
R-squared 0.628 0.682 0.640 0.694 0.188 0.273 0.219 0.305
Panel C: Model 5
Dec.-Jan. Enrollment Change Dec.-Jan. Enrollment % Change
treat overall 154.346*** 161.143*** 66.955** 66.349*** 0.089* 0.100** 0.222*** 0.205***
(26.869) (26.381) (26.612) (25.548) (0.046) (0.046) (0.079) (0.076)
Observations 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533 7,533
R-squared 0.440 0.523 0.453 0.536 0.183 0.271 0.219 0.307
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Time Trend NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: The table reports the DID estimates of the effect of the 5-star SEP. The outcome variable
is the difference in the contract enrollment between December and January (of the same year)
calculated either in levels (first four columns) or in percentage (latter four columns). The four
model specifications considered for each dependent variable differ in the set of controls used, as
reported in the block at the very end of the table.
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Table B.4: MA Contracts - Risk Score Part C and D - Additional
Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: 4-4.5 Both Years
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
5 Star -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.005*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674 5,674
R-squared 0.419 0.948 0.424 0.953 0.388 0.916 0.397 0.923
Panel B: Matched Sample
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
5 Star -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.018*** -0.015***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 8,234 8,234 8,234 8,234 8,234 8,234 8,234 8,234
R-squared 0.290 0.939 0.295 0.942 0.277 0.912 0.282 0.917
Panel C: Placebo
Risk Score Part C Risk Score Part D
Star 5 -0.003 -0.003 -0.018*** -0.006 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,114
R-squared 0.381 0.949 0.389 0.955 0.410 0.925 0.415 0.930
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
County FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Time Trend NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Notes: The table reports the DID estimates of the effect of the 5-star SEP. The outcome variable
is the risk score for Part C (first four columns) and Part D (latter four columns). The four model
specifications considered for each dependent variable differ in the set of controls used, as reported
in the block at the very end of the table.
Table B.5: PDP Plans - Within and Across Year Enrollment Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Within-Year Across-Year
Change % Change Change % Change
5 Star 2,419** 2,416** 0.128** 0.130** -17,835 -17,582 -0.0786 -0.0803
(919.3) (900.4) (0.0567) (0.0550) (12,233) (11,985) (0.0896) (0.0873)
Observations 499 499 499 499 497 497 372 372
R-squared 0.018 0.026 0.204 0.251 0.186 0.202 0.074 0.097
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Contract FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
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